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Colonel Dunlap argues that civilian control of the United States
military is eroding as a result of seemingly disparate phenomena. Colo-
nel Dunlap first examines the American tradition of antimilitarism,
which he believes no longer effectively restrains the modern armed
forces. He then analyzes the effects of the military's elevated public sup-
port, the evolving nature of the leadership elite, and the increasing vul-
nerability of constitutional safeguards to military influence. In an effort
to assess the current predicament, Colonel Dunlap introduces the new
paradigm of postmodern militarism that challenges traditional notions
of civilian control. Noting the potential long-term implications of exces-
sive military influence, Colonel Dunlap concludes that immediate steps
must be taken to revitalize civilian control of the military.
This is not a Latin American junta .... This is a country where the
civilians do call the shots and the armed forces serve at the pleasure of
the public. They may not like it but they should go along.1
Arthur Kropp
Few assumptions about American politics seem more settled than
that of civilian control of the military. Professor Allan Milett predicted
in a comprehensive study that "civilian control of military policy should
be as enduring as it has already proved in two hundred years of na-
* Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command. B.A. 1972, St. Joseph's Uni-
versity (PA); J.D. 1975, Villanova University; 1992, National War College. The views and
opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Department of Defense or any of its components. 0 1994.
1. John Lancaster, Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy Just the Opening Skir-
mish?, WASH. PosT, Feb. 1, 1993, at 10 (quoting Arthur Kropp, President of the People for
the American Way, a liberal lobbying group).
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tionhood. '' 2 Similarly, in April 1993 the editors of the redoubtable Wash-
ington Post assured their readership that the "honorable tradition" of
democratic civilian control of the military is not in danger.
3
This article takes a less optimistic view.4 Civilian control of
America's still sizeable military5 is instead eroding, albeit slowly and
often inconspicuously. The erosion of civilian control does not imply that
a malevolent conspiracy exists within the armed services. Instead, the de-
cline in civilian control is a subtle drift towards an uncertain destination.
The decline indirectly results from a combination of seemingly disparate
trends, programs, and circumstances. Further, the erosion very often re-
ceives the unwitting aid of well-meaning civilian leaders and military per-
sonnel with the best of intentions.
The accomplices in the decline of civilian control are the American
people themselves. Rather than resisting military intrusion into civilian
affairs, Americans turn to the armed forces ever more frequently to pro-
vide answers when conventional political methodologies fail. This article
contends that the trend threatens the nation's long-term interests.
This article initially studies the parameters of an American model for
civilian control of the military. It then argues that antimilitarism-the
cornerstone of the American political tradition of civilian supremacy-has
so declined that it no longer serves as an impetus for civilian control. The
historical overview also demonstrates that the Vietnam War, perhaps the
apex of antimilitarism in modern America, paradoxically served as the
catalyst for the military's dramatic rise in status.
The military's elevated standing, combined with other circumstances
of the contemporary political landscape, invites an unprecedented insinu-
ation of the military into American life. The evolving nature of the lead-
ership elite and the increasing vulnerability of key constitutional
safeguards against military influence facilitate the insinuation. This arti-
cle introduces a new paradigm-postmodern militarism-that presents a
unique challenge to the concept of civilian control. Finally, this article
offers suggestions to reinvigorate civilian control while accommodating
America's security needs in the last decade of the twentieth century.
2. ALLAN R. MILLErr, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE
MILITARY 61 (1979).
3. The Commander in Chief, WASH. PosT, Nat'l Wkly. Ed., Apr. 12-18, 1993, at 27.
4. A small but growing number of commentators are expressing similar concerns. See,
e.g., A.J. Bacevich, Clinton's Military Problem-And Ours, NAT'L REV., Dec. 13, 1993, at 36;
Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, NAT'L INTEREST,
Spring 1994, at 3; Russell F. Weigley, The American Military and the Principle of Civilian
Control from McClellan to Powell, 57 J. MIL. HIsT., Oct. 1993, at 27. The author has previ-
ously touched on the issue of the vitality of civilian control of the military. See Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, PARAMETERS, Winter 1992-
93, at 2.
5. The Tampa Tribune reported: "Since reaching a post-Vietnam peak of 2.17 million
in 1987, the number of people in uniform has dropped 21 percent to 1.71 million. That
figure is projected to bottom out at 1.4 million in 1999." Steve Huettel, In Retreat, TAMPA
Tam., Nov. 28, 1993, at 1, 14.
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I. WHAT IS CIVILIAN CONTROL?
In his treatise, The Soldier and the State,' Professor Samuel P.
Huntington complained that despite many references to civilian control
of the military in historical literature, a satisfactory definition of the term
had yet to emerge.1 In an attempt to remedy the deficiency, Huntington
defined "civilian control" by describing the mode of achieving it. The ac-
cepted formula in Western nations like the United States was, according
to Huntington, "subjective" civilian control.8 Subjective civilian control
involved "maximizing the power of civilian groups in relation to the mili-
tary" with particular civilian institutions, constitutional forms, and social
class distinctions.9 Unfortunately, due to its focus on process, Hunting-
ton's approach did not readily serve as an analytical tool.
Professors Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin took a more ortho-
dox approach to defining civilian control.0 They described the principle
as being composed of two related parts: "First, the ends of government
policy are to be set by civilians; the military is limited to decisions about
means . . . .Second, it is for the civilian leadership to decide where the
line between ends and means (and hence between civilian and military
responsibility) is to be drawn."" However, the definition falls to acknowl-
edge the dangers that arise when elected officials freely set policy that
allows the uniformed services to encroach upon areas that ought to be
administered by non-military agencies. The definition also inadequately
addresses the situation in which "the line between ends and means" is
drawn to assign to the military matters that democracies should not allot
to their most powerful and authoritarian arm.
Consequently, it is necessary to add a third interrelated element to
Kemp and Hudlin's definition. In no event should the military, to para-
phrase President Eisenhower, 2 be allowed to acquire unwarranted influ-
ence, whether sought or unsought, in civilian affairs. Defined as such, the
6. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE (1957); cf. Edward M.
Coffman, The Long Shadow of The Soldier and The State, 55 J. MiL. HIST., June 1991, at
69.
7. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 80.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Kenneth W. Kemp & Charles Hudlin, Civil Supremacy Over the Military: Its Na-
ture and Limits, ARMED FORCES & Soc'y, Fall 1992, at 7.
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. In his 1961 Farewell Address, President Eisenhower admonished:
In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of un-
warranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or
democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial
and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that
security and liberty may prosper together.
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., 18 ANNALS OF AMERICA 3 (1976).
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principle of civilian control may be offended when the influence of the
armed forces extends into areas that endanger liberties or the democratic
process, even when that expansion is sanctioned by the civilian leader-
ship. The revised definition addresses what Millett identified as the pur-
pose of civilian control: "to ensure that defense policy and the agencies of
defense policy are subordinated to other national traditions, values, cus-
toms, governmental policies, and economic and social institutions."'13 The
additional factor exalts democratic principles over the authoritarian val-
ues that are inherent in the military.14
II. THE TRADITION OF AMERICAN ANTIMILITARISM
Observers of American society frequently cite its traditional an-
timilitarism as the main pillar supporting civilian control of the armed
forces. 15 Americans, the argument goes, are so wary of the military that
any suggestion of unseemly involvement in civilian affairs would be iden-
tified quickly and rooted out.16 Today, however, that argument is obsolete
because the antimilitarism that would stimulate such vigilance no longer
13. MmL-r, supra note 2, at 2. Millett also listed certain prerequisites that he be-
lieved are needed for civilian control to remain predominant in the policy process:
a. the armed forces do not dominate government or impose their unique (how-
ever functional) values upon civilian institutions and organizations.
b. the armed forces have no independent access to resources of military [utility].
c. the armed forces' policies on retirement, pay, education, training, treatment,
promotion, and use of personnel are not inconsistent with basic civil liberties
and individual rights-with some compromises for military discipline and com-
bat effectiveness.
d. the use of military force is not determined by the values of the military insti-
tution itself, either for or against military action, either in the conduct of foreign
or domestic policies. Conversely, civilian decisions on the use of force should not
disregard the relationship of policy ends and military institutional characteris-
tics in terms of personnel, doctrine, training, equipment, and morale.
Id.
14. For a discussion of the instinctively authoritarian values of the military, see infra
notes 353-60 and accompanying text.
15. Military analyst Harry Summers observed: "Americans have a long and proud his-
tory of antimilitarism, and civilian control of the military is one of the foundations of Amer-
ican democracy." Harry Summers, History, Clinton, and LBJ, WASH. Tihms, Oct. 21, 1993,
at 16. Another commentator, exploring the apolitical tradition of the United States military,
attributed civilian control of the military to an antimilitaristic view of a standing army:
There is no express provision in the Constitution for the political neutrality of
the military. The principle is best viewed as a corollary for another constitu-
tional principle, that of civilian control over the military. The mandate of civil-
ian control of the military pervades our constitutional structure and stems from
the deep distrust on the part -of the Founding Fathers of a standing army. Such
a distrust was based on European and American experiences of great power
wielded by a permanent armed force.
J. Bryan Echols, Open Houses Revisited: An Alternative Approach, 129 MIL. L. REV. 185,
200 (1990).
16. Geoffrey Perret insisted that the "antimilitaristic side of the American character is
forever on guard." GEOFFREY PERRET, A COUNTRY MADE BY WAR 560 (Vintage Books 1990)
(1989).
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exists.
To understand the tradition of antimilitarism, it is necessary to ex-
amine its history. Antimilitarism arose in colonial America for two pri-
mary reasons: first, the belief that professional soldiers were the agents of
oppression and, second, the loathsome reputation of the soldiers
themselves.'7
A. The Soldier as an Instrument of Tyranny
Colonial Americans inherited the European view that permanent mil-
itary forces were costly instruments of tyranny.'8 Their experience with
the British regulars who suppressed growing American dissatisfaction
with English rule corroborated that conviction. 9 Answerable only to the
King and his designated governors, the troops were unresponsive to the
colonists' assemblies.20 Incidents like the Boston Massacre only aggra-
vated American hostility toward professional soldiers."
Thus, civilian control of professional militaries became a critical issue
in colonial America. In writing the Declaration of Independence, the colo-
nists charged King George III with keeping standing armies among them
without the consent of their legislatures, and having "affected to render
the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power." 2 2 When
Americans later debated which interests the Constitution would address,
the danger posed by a permanent military establishment was a preemi-
nent concern. The New York Journal of 1788 published a typical view of
standing armies:
The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not
only because the rulers may employ them for the purposes of support-
ing themselves in any usurpations of power, which they may see proper
to exercise, but there is great hazard, that an army will subvert the
forms of the government, under whose authority they are raised, and
establish one, according to the pleasure of their leaders.23
The caution of the early Americans is understandable. In The Man
on Horseback,'24 the classic study of military subversion of civilian rule,
17. See generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MII-
TARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 3-9 (1975).
18. See generally William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitu-
tion: A Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1992) (discussing the evolution of the British
militia).
19. Id. at 23-26.
20. MILLETT, supra note 2, at 4-6.
21. See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24-28 (1971).
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
23. "Brutus" X, That Dangerous Engine of Despotism, A Standing Army, N.Y.J., Jan.
24, 1788, reprinted in LIBRARY OF AMERICA, THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: PART Two 86
(1993). The concerns about a military takeover can be traced to the takeover following the
English Civil War. See Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 11.
24. SAmuEL. E. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEACK (1988). Finer considered the United
States military "strictly subordinated to the civilians." Id. at 3.
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Samuel Finer argued that given the military's "marked superiority in or-
ganization, [its] highly emotionalized symbolic status, and [its] monopoly
of arms . . . [t]he wonder . . . is not why [it] rebels against its civilian
masters, but why it ever obeys them."2 5 Nevertheless, despite the fears of
early Americans, serious military challenges to civilian authority are rare
in United States history.
The "Newburgh Conspiracy" is one of the exceptions. Occurring at
the close of the Revolutionary War, it constituted, according to historian
Richard H. Kohn, the "closest an American army has ever come to revolt
or coup d'6tat.' 2 6 Originating in the discontent of unpaid troops en-
camped near Newburgh, New York, and fostered by nationalists who saw
the revolt as an opportunity to increase the taxing ability (and hence the
power) of the central government, the nascent conspiracy collapsed after
General George Washington delivered a speech to condemn it.2 7
The most renowned recent challenge to civilian authority came from
one of America's most famous military leaders, General Douglas MacAr-
thur.2 8 Frustrated with President Harry Truman's reluctance to allow
American forces to attack air and naval bases in China during the Korean
War, MacArthur attempted to circumvent the President's policies. Tru-
man, who feared that attacks against the Chinese mainland could lead to
a wider conflict-one possibly including a nuclear confrontation with the
Soviet Union-relieved MacArthur of his command after the general
openly criticized the President.29 MacArthur returned to the United
States to a hero's welcome, addressed a joint session of Congress, made an
abortive bid for the presidency, and then "faded away."2' 0 Truman biogra-
pher David McCullough declared that the Truman-MacArthur contro-
versy "challenged [civilian control] as never before in the nation's
history."' Significantly, however, as noted by Professor D. Clayton
James, there is no evidence that MacArthur ever "harbored dreams of
gaining political power by force or other unconstitutional means.
12
25. Id. at 5.
26. KOHN, supra note 17, at 17.
27. Id. at 32. For the text of General Washington's speech, see WILLIAM SAFIRE, LEND
ME YOUR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 91-94 (1993); see also Richard H. Kohn, Ameri-
can Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint, in RECONSIDERATION OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY WAR. SELECTED ESSAYS 104-23 (Don Higgenbotham ed., 1978) [hereinafter
Kohn, Introduction]. Kohn credited the first group of American generals, not Washington
alone, for establishing the legacy of subordination and restraint of the military. Id. at 123.
28. See generally R. EARNEST DuPUY & TREVOR N. DuPuY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILI-
TARY HISTORY 1247-48 (2d rev. ed. 1977); Roy K. Flint, The Truman-MacArthur Conflict:
Dilemmas of Civil Military Relations in the Nuclear Age, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 223-67 (Richard H. Kohn ed.,
1991); David McCullough, Truman Fires MacArthur, MIL. HIST. Q., Autumn 1992, at 8.
29. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN (1992).
30. The reference to "fade away" is taken from the conclusion of MacArthur's April
19, 1951 speech to a joint session of Congress wherein he said, referring to himself, that "old
soldiers never die; they just fade away." See SAFIRE, supra note 27, at 379.
31. McCullough, supra note 28, at 21.
32. See D. Clayton James, Harry S. Truman, in COMMANDERS IN CHIEF 107, 120 (Jo-
[Vol. 29
MILITARY CONTROL
Few other events in American history challenged civilian control of
the military. Most can be described as either long-ago33 or nearly forgot-
ten,-4 grossly speculative,3 5 or obviously preposterous.3 " In any event, the
military never has made an overt attempt to seize power.
B. The Soldier as a Societal Outcast
The second source of traditional American antimilitarism is rooted in
a revulsion for those who served as career soldiers in the late eighteenth
century. At that time, soldiering-especially in the enlisted ranks-was
an appalling experience.37 To steel soldiers for the tightly packed forma-
tions that marched terrifyingly close to their opponents to achieve effec-
tive musket fire, officers resorted to relentless drill and brutal discipline.38
Few sought such ghastly employment. The Comte de Guibert wrote
in 1772 that the profession of soldiering had been abandoned "to the
most vile and miserable class of citizen." 39 Similarly, General Sir John
Hackett observed that during the eighteenth century "[t]he common sol-
dier [held] . . . a position in society which was almost that of an out-
cast.' '40 Early Americans brought this disparaging view of soldiering with
seph G. Dawson, III ed., 1993). James believed MacArthur "did not present a threat to civil-
military relations in the United States." Id.
33. See, e.g., Jonathan Lurie, Andrew Jackson, Martial Law, Civilian Control of the
Military, and American Politics: An Intriguing Amalgam, 126 MIL. L. REV. 133 (1989) (dis-
cussing President Andrew Jackson's militaristic usurpation of judicial authority); see also
Harold M. Hyman, Ulysses Grant I, Emperor of America?: Some Civil-Military Continu-
ities and Strains of the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE UNITED STATES MILrARY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 175 (Richard H. Kohn ed.,
1991); Weigley, supra note 4 (discussing McClellan/Lincoln relationship in context of civil-
ian control of the military); cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 842 (1976) (Burger, J., concur-
ring) ("It is only a little more than a century ago that some officers of the Armed Forces,
then in combat, sought to exercise undue influence either for President Lincoln or for his
opponent, General McClellan, in the election of 1864.").
34. One nearly forgotten incident that may receive renewed attention in the military
debate over roles and missions is known as the "Revolt of the Admirals." The 1949 contro-
versy was a "flare-up of the feud between the advocates of land-based alrpower and those of
sea-based airpower" and constituted "a flagrant peacetime challenge hurled by top-ranking
military men at the civilian leadership of the military." Keith D. McFarland, The 1949 Re-
volt of the Admirals, in THE PARAMETERS OF WAR 149, 149 (Lloyd Matthews & Dale E.
Brown eds., 1987).
35. See, e.g., LEN COLODNY & ROBERT GETTLIN, SILENT Coup: THE REMOVAL OF A PRESI-
DENT (1991) (arguing that President's Nixon's downfall was engineered by the military).
36. One of the most preposterous is the allegation that the Kennedy assassination was
a coup d'6tat engineered by the Pentagon. See The Conspiracy Theories, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
22, 1993, at 99.
37. See generally JOHN KEEGAN & RICHARD HOLMES, SOLDIERS: A HISTORY OF MEN IN
BATTLE 66-67 (1986).
38. KOHN, supra note 17, at 2.
39. GENERAL SIR JOHN HACKETr, THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 83 (1983) (quoting 1 ESSAI
G9N9 DE TACTIQUE, OUEVRES MILITAIRES 13 (1803)).
40. Id. Hackett commented:
The quality of the private soldier has rarely been lower than in the armies of
mid-eighteenth-century Europe. In the contemporary European outlook there
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them to the New World. Soldiers deployed to America in service of the
British King, and the Continental Army whose composition mirrored its
European counterpart,41 confirmed the unfavorable perceptions of profes-
sional militaries.
III. ANTIMILITARISM AND THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Antimilitarism spurred much of the thinking about the organization
of the new nation's defenses.42 In fact, the Supreme Court noted in
Perpich v. Department of Defense43 that the Constitutional Convention
was infused with a "widespread fear that a national standing Army posed
an intolerable threat to individual liberty and the sovereignty of the sepa-
rate states."'44 Virtually forswearing involvement in overseas conflicts,"
the Founding Fathers considered foreign invasion and attacks by native
Americans along the frontier as the principal threats to American secur-
ity.4 A modest navy and a small standing army 47 backed by a citizen
militia48 was deemed sufficient to counter these threats. While the final
version of the Constitution accommodated both a standing army"9 and a
militia,50 the document reflected a prevailing view favoring dependence
on the militia."1
was no heroic view of war as an ennobling experience. No especial esteem at-
tached to a warrior class.. .. No one enlisted unless he was nearly at the end of
his tether.
Id.
41. See Kohn, supra note 27, at 107. Kohn related: "[B]eginning in 1777 the Conti-
nental army began to mirror its European relative in social composition: The soldiery was a
mixed lot of convicted Tories, criminals, British deserters, bounty jumpers, draftees, and
drafted substitutes-an army overwhelmingly of the young, of the poor, of rootless laborers
and tradesmen." Id.
42. For a general discussion of the national security debate and the formation of the
Constitution, see Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of
the Framers, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1989, at 61-94 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991); Engdahl, supra note 21, at 35-42.
43. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
44. Id. at 340 n.5.
45. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA, INC., supra note 12, at 520 (reporting George Wash-
ington's Proclamation of Neutrality).
46. See Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 32.
47. George Washington in his Farewell Address of September 19, 1796, counseled:
"[O]vergrown military establishments . . . under any form of government are inauspicious
to liberty and. . . are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty." 1 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., supra note 12, at 609.
48. See MILLETT, supra note 2, at 8-9 (noting that by law service secretaries could not
be active officers of the armed services, thereby ensuring civilian control); T.A. Heppen-
heimer, Build-Down, Am. HERITAGE, Dec. 1993, at 34, 34-36.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
50. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
51. See generally Richard H. Kohn, Introduction, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 5 (Richard M. Kohn ed.,
1991) (commenting that the militia system was inserted in the Constitution as a primary
defense institution due to violent prejudice against standing armies); Fields & Hardy, supra
note 18, at 33-38 (discussing debate over type of military establishment to be provided in
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Until relatively recently the system worked as conceived by the
Framers. Enormous military forces raised for the Civil War and two
World Wars largely demobilized at the end of hostilities.52 After World
War II, however, advances in technology and the development of exten-
sive transnational economic and political ties obliged the United States to
maintain a massive, permanent peacetime military establishment.53 Al-
though antimilitarism yielded to Cold War realities by necessity, Ameri-
cans did not completely abandon their traditional vigilance. Alerted by
President Eisenhower's warning about the growth of the military-indus-
trial complex,54 skepticism of the military establishment persisted well
into the Cold War.55 The skepticism deepened during the Cold War's
most famous prodigy: the Vietnam War.
A. The Impact of the Vietnam War
It is difficult to overstate the impact of Vietnam on the United States
military and the issue of civilian control. Among other things, the conflict
inspired a resurgence of antimilitarism in American society. Equally im-
portant, the war tremendously affected the attitudes and decisions of to-
day's military leaders. For many Vietnam veterans the war was the
watershed event of their personal and professional lives and continues to
shape their views.56 Above all else, the veterans molded by Vietnam are
determined to avoid repeating the mistakes of the war.57
Characterizing the United States' involvement in Vietnam, Lt. Gen.
Philip B. Davidson observed, "Our principle vulnerability was the weak-
ness inherent in democracy itself-the incapacity to sustain a long, un-
focused, inconclusive, and bloody war far from home, for unidentified or
ill-defined national objectives.""" Most analysts agree that a meddlesome
Constitution).
52. See Heppenheimer, supra note 48.
53. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe noted:
It was not until after World War Two that the change began, chiefly as a conse-
quence of America's global conflict with the Soviet Union. Containing the Sovi-
ets required large standing forces and began consuming an eye-opening share of
the federal budget . . .A massive infrastructure of military bases was estab-
lished throughout the country, deeply affecting local economies and politics.
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR. & DAVID CHANOFF, THE LINE OF FIRE 23-24 (1993); see also
DAVID R. SEGAL, RECRUITING FOR UNCLE SAM: CITIZENSHIP AND MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY
2-6 (1989) (commenting on the changing structure of the military after World War II).
54. For the text of President Eisenhower's admonishment, see supra note 12.
55. In his treatise, Millett argued that "[i]f anything, the proliferating agents of civil-
ian control has more than kept pace with the size of the standing forces, the hugeness of the
military budget, and the importance of national security affairs." MLLErr, supra note 2, at
38. For an early 1960's critique of the military establishment, see JOHN M. SWOMLEY, JR.,
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (1964).
56. See generally AL SANTOLI, LEADING THE WAY: How VIETNAM VETERANS REBUILT
THE U.S. MILITARY: AN ORAL HISTORY (1993).
57. See id.
58. PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, VIETNAM AT WAR-THE HISTORY: 1946-1975, at 797-98 (1988).
1994]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
executive branch,59 paired with a politically paralyzed Congress, 0 also
hindered the war effort. Moreover, many in uniform believe that a hostile,
almost treasonous press fought them at every turn. 1 Most troubling for
the veterans of Vietnam, it seemed that even the American people had
abandoned them. With soldiers facing open hostility in the streets, Amer-
ican antimilitarism reached its modern zenith.6 2
Not all of the military's problems were externally generated. Outmo-
ded strategy,6s a disintegration of discipline s 4 and the rise of rampant
careerism 5 crippled effectiveness. In the years following Vietnam, virtu-
ally every aspect of the war was dissected, analyzed, and studied by the
military.e Studies included an examination of the role of civilian institu-
tions, often the very ones expected to exercise civilian control of the
armed forces. 6 7
Despite the deluge of analysis performed in the wake of Vietnam,
59. Former Senator Barry Goldwater offered a harsh assessment of President Lyndon
Johnson's wartime leadership: "[He] didn't know his rear end from a hot rock about run-
ning a war." Dotson Rader, "This Country Had to Make a Decided Change," PARADE MAG.,
Nov. 28, 1993, at 4, 5. Moreover, the civilian leadership did not limit itself to its proper role
as the policymaker. Instead, it repeatedly dabbled in purely military matters despite no
apparent qualifications to do so. For example, Lieutenant General Davidson noted that dur-
ing the Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam:
Johnson, McNamara, and their civilian underlings not only established the phi-
losophy of the program, they decided what targets should be hit, the number of
planes to be used, and on occasion, even the type and weight of bombs to be
employed. To see Johnson and McNamara huddled over maps and aerial photo-
graphs planning air strikes would have been ludicrous, had the consequences not
been so serious. As a result of the restrictions and the interference of the "self-
appointed air marshals" (Westmoreland's words), ROLLING THUNDER's ini-
tial efforts were futile.
DAVIDSON, supra note 58, at 341. Likewise, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., reported that John-
son acted as "the target officer" for air strikes for most of his presidency. BRUCE PALMER,
JR., THE 25-YEAR WAR: AMERICA'S MILITARY ROLE IN VIETNAM 37 (1984).
60. See HARRY G. SUMMERS, ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
21-32 (1982) [hereinafter SUMMERS, VIETNAM WAR].
61. For a discussion of the press' coverage of military action, see infra part VI.D.
62. According to Morris Janowitz, the 1960-70 period produced "the most violent an-
timilitarism in modern United States history." MORRIS JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOL-
DIER A SocIAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT I (2d ed. 1971).
63. See David Hackworth, The War Without End, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1993, at 44-
48. Colonel David Hackworth, a decorated officer, argued that the "U.S. military fought an
unconventional war with conventional tactics." Id. at 45.
64. See GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 153-61 (1978).
65. E.g., John J. Douglass, The Nineteenth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Mili-
tary Lawyer Ethics, 129 Ma. L. REV. 11, 17 (1990).
66. Ike Skelton, Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-Cold War Era, MIL.
REV., Sept. 1993, at 2, 11 ("The bitter experience of Vietnam ... sent American military
men back to the study of war and military history."). The careful study produced results.
"More than any other institution in the federal government, the Pentagon studied its fail-
ures, learned from them and reformed." E.J. Dionne, Jr., Martial Metaphors: Gulf Victory
Alters Political Rhetoric by Giving Rise to All-Purpose Language, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
1991, at A21 (quoting White House planner James P. Pinkerton).
67. See Skelton, supra note 66, at 7-10.
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only the debacle of Desert One"8 and the massive budgetary increases of
the Reagan years" offered the military both the impetus and the re-
sources to effect genuine change. Congress also attempted to revitalize the
military by enacting the multifaceted Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986'0 that became the foundation of the
congressional effort. 1 The changes stimulated a dazzling transformation.
68. See PAUL B. RYAN, THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION 8-9 (1985). "Desert One" refers to
the abortive attempt to rescue American hostages who were seized by Iranian militants on
November 4, 1979. The rescue attempt ended in catastrophe on April 24, 1980, when U.S.
aircraft collided at a staging area in Iran designated Desert One. Id. at 1. Eight American
military personnel died in the effort. Id. The hostages were eventually released on January
20, 1981. Id. at 105. See generally CHARLIE A. BECKWITH & DONALD KNOX, DELTA FORCE
(1983) (providing a first-hand account of the rescue mission); DANIEL P. BOLGER, AMERICANS
AT WAR 99-168 (1988).
69. Jacques S. Gansler described the Reagan build-up:
At the end of the 1970s, the United States was spending approximately $150
billion a year on its defense establishment. The public felt that this did not
provide a "strong America," and gave Ronald Reagan a mandate for significant
increases in the defense budget. Within six years the defense budget had almost
doubled and an extra trillion dollars had been spent on increasing America's
military power.
JACQUES S. GANSLER, AFFORDING DEFENSE 1 (1989).
70. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 10 U.S.C.).
71. Some observers consider the Goldwater-Nichols Act as the "third wave" of reform
since the National Security Act of 1947. See Christopher A. Yuknis, The Goldwater-Nichols
Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment, in ESSAYS ON STRATEGY X, at 75, 77-83
(Mary A. Sommerville ed., 1993). Interestingly, one of the stated purposes of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act is to "strengthen civilian authority" within the Department of Defense. Section
3 of Goldwater-Nichols provides:
SEC. 3 POLICY
In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the con-
gressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401)-
(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian au-
thority in the Department;
(2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the Na-
tional Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and
specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions as-
signed to those commands;
(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and
specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsi-
bility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned
to their commands;
(5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contin-
gency planning;
(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
(8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and im-
prove the management and administration of the Department of
Defense.
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, § 3, 100 Stat. at 993-94 (em-
phasis added).
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In 1988 U.S. News & World Report related: "In contrast to the dispirited,
drug-ravaged, do your-own-thing armed services of the '70s and early
'80s, the U.S. military has been transformed into a fighting force of gun-
ho attitude, spit-shined discipline, and ten-hut morale. '7 2
Positive results on the battlefields soon followed. Qualified successes
in Grenada,7 3 Libya, 4 and Panama 5 set the stage for the spectacular Gulf
War triumph. Televised images of stupefied Iraqi soldiers grovelling
before their American captors enthralled America. Such pictures ended
more than two decades of what Rick Atkinson described as "self-re-
proach, mistrust, and an abiding doubt in U.S. military prowess." 76 At-
kinson declared that following the Gulf War, the "competency and
efficacy of the American military was now beyond question." 77 Perhaps
even more important, the military's superlative performance "reaffirmed
the bond between those in uniform and the larger republic."78 An-
timilitarism all but disappeared.7 1
B. Today's. Military
The United States military of the 1990's bears little resemblance to
the forces that spawned antimilitarism in colonial America. The virtual
absence of any record of overt military intervention into civil affairs has
cast the Founding Fathers' fear of a military takeover as a mere oddity of
an earlier era.s0 The American political psyche no longer entertains any
conscious apprehension of the military as a tool of political oppression."'
Thus, a principal basis for the traditional antimilitarism that historically
assured civilian control of the military is extinct.
The current American complacency about military control is likely
attributable to an inadequate understanding of the many forms that mili-
72. Michael Satchell et. al., The Military's New Stars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
18, 1988, at 33.
73. See BOLGER, supra note 68, at 261-358.
74. See generally CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 129-45 (characterizing the at-
tack on Libya as eminently successful).
75. See generally CLARENCE E. BRIGGS III, OPERATION JUST CAUSE: PANAMA DECEMBER
1989: A SOLDIER'S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT (1990).
76. RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF 493 (1993).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 495.
79. See HARRY SUMMERS, ON STRATEGY II: A CRrrIcAL ANALYSIS OF THE GULF WAR 13-
19 (1992).
80. See Kohn, supra note 27, at 105 (commenting on dissipation of Americans' fear of
military takeover).
81. One example of the American tradition is related by columnist Art Buchwald:
I was at the White House that night to hear [President Nixon's] resignation
speech, and what impressed me more than anything else was that while one
leader of our country was resigning and another was taking his place, I did not
see one tank or one helmeted soldier in the street and the only uniforms I saw
that night were two motorcycle policeman who were directing traffic on Pennsyl-
vania Avenue.
JAY M. SHAFRITZ, WORDS ON WAR 58 (1990) (quoting Art Buchwald).
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tary subversion of civilian control can take. Popular notions of military
intervention tend to focus on overt military takeovers. Overt intervention
is, however, not the only threat to civilian authority in the United
States-or even the principal one. For example, Finer contended that
military intervention in politics in developed countries seldom involves
the actual overthrow of a government."2 Typically, more subtle and ma-
nipulative threats exist, with a level of intervention ranging from influ-
ence to blackmail.8 3
As Americans no longer view the armed forces as an instrument of
tyranny, they no longer abhor the persona of the soldiers. The reason is
simple: Instead of drawing from the dregs of society, today's military
picks from among the nation's finest. With ninety-four percent of military
recruits possessing high school diplomas,s4 enlisted personnel are better
educated than the general populace. Virtually all officers have graduated
from college, and most senior officers hold post-graduate degrees.8 5 Addi-
tionally, studies show that top military officers are frequently more intel-
ligent than their civilian counterparts.8 6 Demonstrating the military's
organizational excellence and societal respect, military leadership tech-
niques8 7 are now the envy of business and government.8 8 Moreover, unlike
82. Finer explained:
At first glance the characteristic "mode" of military intervention is the violent
overturn of a government and the characteristic "level" is the establishment of
overt military rule. Yet often, the military works on governments from behind
the scenes; and even when they do establish a military dictatorship, they usually
fabricate some quasi-civilian facade of government behind which they retire as
fast as possible. Overt military rule is relatively rare, and, apparently, short-
lived.
FINER, supra note 24, at 4.
83. Id. at 77-80. Finer also enumerated several modes of intervention:
(1) The normal constitutional channels.
(2) Collusion and/or competition with the civilian authorities.
(3) The intimidation of the civilian authorities.
(4) Threats of non-cooperation with, or violence towards, the civilian authorities.
(5) Failure to defend the civilian authorities from violence.
(6) The exercise of violence against the civilian authorities.
Id. at 127.
84. Until recently, the rate was even higher. See Military Recruits Decline in Quality,
WASH. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at 5.
85. For example, one survey revealed that over 88% of brigadier generals had an ad-
vanced degree, compared with 19% of top civilian business leaders. See David Gergen,
America's New Heroes, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 1991, at 76.
86. A survey of 163 new Army brigadier generals revealed that their IQs were in the
92nd percentile of the population. See Bruce W. Nelan, Revolution in Defense, TIME, Mar.
18, 1991, at 25.
87. Technological changes in the latter half of the twentieth century caused political
scientist Harold D. Lasswell to project "that 'specialists in violence'-that is, military
elites-would add management to their repertoire of skills and would become a major force
in ruling elites." SEGAL, supra note 53, at 4.
88. For instance, in the best seller, A Passion for Excellence, management gurus Tom
Peters and Nancy Austin invited industry to emulate the innovative techniques of Air Force
leaders. See generally Toni PETERS & NANCY AUSTIN, A PASSION FOR EXCELLENCE (1985).
Similarly, Vice President Al Gore, in his capacity as head of the National Performance Re-
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the rest of America, the highly disciplined post-Vietnam military is rela-
tively drug- and crime-free. 9 It earns kudos as an enlightened avenue for
social advancement by African-Americans and other minorities.90 The
plethora of initiatives resulting from the Tailhook scandal 1 also suggests
that the military may emerge as the model for the proper treatment of
women in the workplace.
C. The Military's Growing Popularity
The American public no longer views the armed forces with the fear
and loathing that produced the antimilitarism that provided the intellec-
tual infrastructure for civilian control of the military in this country. In
1993 the steadily climbing approval rating for the military reached a
twenty-seven-year high. 2 A Harris poll spokesman reported that "[n]o
other major institution, profession, or interest group comes close [to the
military].19 3 The remarkable resiliency of the military's popularity also is
notable; it remains evidently unfazed by the women-in-combat debate,9 4
the Tailhook scandal, 5 and the gays-in-the-military controversy.9
IV. THE NEW POLITIcAL ENVIRONMENT
A. Do Americans Believe Democracy Is Failing?
In a free society the most important poll of public opinion is taken
on election day. Casting a vote is the ultimate expression of democracy
and fundamentally indicates the public's commitment to the democratic
system. The strength of the commitment carries striking implications for
view, insisted that "military commands can teach civilian government much about effi-
ciency, morale and clear objectives." Michael Ruby, Rube Goldberg, R.LP., U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Aug. 16, 1993, at 64 (quoting Vice-President Al Gore); see also Al Gore: What
Business Can Teach the Feds, Bus. Wit, Sept. 13, 1993, at 102.
89. See, e.g., Tracy Gwinn, Parachutists Want to Share Highs with Kids, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 12, 1993, at 8B.
90. See generally Charles Moskos, From Citizens' Army to Social Laboratory, WILSON
Q., Winter 1993, at 83, 87-90.
91. Tailhook refers to the alleged sexual abuse of women by Navy and Marine Corps
aviators at the Tailhook Association convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, in September 1991.
The Tailhook Association draws its name from the arresting device used to stop planes
landing on aircraft carriers. For a discussion of the allegations and their repercussions, see
generally J. Richard Chema, Arresting "Tailhook" The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment
in the Military, 140 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1993).
92. Public Confident About Military, SOLDIERS, June 1993, at 5 (reporting results from
Harris poll).
93. John T. Correll, Opinions, AIR FORCE, June 1993, at 26.
94. See Bruce W. Nelan, Annie Get Your Gun, TImE, May 10, 1993, at 38.
95. For a brief discussion of the Tailhook scandal, see supra note 91.
96. For a discussion of the gays-in-the-military debate, see U.S. Decides Not to Ap-
peal Gay Ruling, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1993, at 4. For a discussion of the legal aspects of the
gays-in-the-military debate, see David Schlueter, Gays and Lesbians in the Military: A Ra-
tionally Based Solution to a Legal Rubik's Cube, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393 (1994); Spiro
P. Fotopoulos, Note, The Beginning of the End for the Military's Traditional Policy on
Homosexuals: Steffan v. Aspin, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (1994).
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civilian control of the military. In 1964 one analyst maintained that a
coup d'6tat in the United States is "too fantastic to contemplate" be-
cause, among other things, "the bulk of the people are strongly attached
to the prevailing political system. . . .The environment most hospitable
to coups d'6tat is one in which political apathy prevails as the dominant
style.' 97
American commitment to the democratic political system is weaken-
ing, insofar as voter participation accurately measures the commitment.
For the past three decades voter participation generally has declined,
though the trend was interrupted temporarily in 1992 by the interest gen-
erated by billionaire Ross Perot's bid for the presidency."8 The weakening
attachment to the political system evoked a warning from Business
Week: "When people become divorced from the political system, dema-
gogues thrive, extremism flourishes."99
Whatever threat to civilian control political apathy might pose, it is
dwarfed by the potential peril of outright hostility to elected government.
Increasing animosity to democratic government is based on a growing
consensus that elected politicians are failing to alleviate the economic and
physical insecurity of vast numbers of Americans. 0 0 Variously described
as the "Age of Insecurity"'' 1 and the "Age of Anxiety,"'0 2 Americans live
in an era permeated by a dread of unemployment. They believe, econo-
mist Robert J. Samuelson has argued, that "something fundamental has
'gone wrong' with the economy.'' 3 Senator Bill Bradley aptly summed
up the crisis: "There are millions of Americans who find economic secur-
ity an unattainable dream.' '104
Superimposed over the deep-seated economic worries is an even
greater fear of crime. The explosion of random violence terrifies Ameri-
cans.10 5 "Crime," according to Senate Judiciary Chairman Joseph Biden,
"is the single most pressing issue on the minds of the American peo-
97. ANDREW C. JANOS, THE SEIZURE OF POWER: A STUDY OF FORCE AND POPULAR CON-
SENT 39 (1964) (Research Monograph No. 16, Center of International Studies, Princeton
University).
98. Voter turnout hit a 64-year low in 1988 (50.17%), capping a downward trend that
began in 1960. See THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC 1992, at 89 (1991). With less than 27% of the
eligible electorate actually voting for the current Commander-in-Chief (43% of a 54% turn-
out), the 1992 election failed to represent a renaissance of democratic majoritarianism.
99. Deflating Uncle Sam's Bureaucratic Bloat, Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 1993, at 110 [here-
inafter Deflating Bureaucratic Bloat].
100. See Robert J. Samuelson, The Great American Fantasy, WASH. POST, Nat'l
Wkly. Ed., Nov. 1-7, 1993, at 18.
101. Jobs in the Age of Insecurity, TIME, Nov. 22, 1993, at 32.
102. See Frank Swoboda, A Safety Net for a Nervous Work Force, WASH. POST, Nat'l
WkIy. Ed., Oct. 25-31, 1993, at 18.
103. Samuelson, supra note 100, at 18. Professor Samuelson believed that the pessi-
mism is misplaced in that economic fluctuations are part of economic growth and should be
considered as nothing more than passing aberrations.
104. Swoboda, supra note 102, at 18 (quoting Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ)).
105. See, e.g., Ted Gest, Violence and Its Terrifying Randomness, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 20, 1993, at 6.
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ple."106 Poll after poll has demonstrated that frightened citizens will sup-
port expensive, sometimes draconian responses to lawlessness. 107 For
example, a 1990 poll revealed a majority of Americans who believed that
the Bill of Rights is a luxury no longer affordable. 0 8 With sixty-one per-
cent of Americans convinced that crime in their community is increas-
ing,109 it is no surprise that they turn their homes and public places into
fortresses.11 0  Sacrificed is the social interaction which underpins
democracy."'
In a complete reversal of the colonial era, Americans find the demo-
cratically elected political leaders, not the "standing army," corrupt and
repugnant. A September 1993 Business Week editorial concluded:
It's clear most Americans don't trust their government much.
They don't trust it to deliver services, solve social problems, or
boost their fortunes efficiently. Just the opposite. Government
appears to work against them as much as for them these days.
Beneath the surface of the tax revolt and the movement for
term limits is the public's sense of abandonment, abuse, and be-
trayal by government.1 2
The American public's approval of the performance of their elected lead-
ers has reached historic lows."'1 The trend has serious implications. U.S.
News & World Report echoed the warnings of others: "Government that
does not deliver value inevitably breaks the social compact with the peo-
ple, and that can be dangerous." 1 4 The one branch of government that
does deliver, however, is the "can do" military. One commentator has ob-
served that "[a]t a time when a growing number of Americans are disillu-
sioned with government. . . the military stands in singular counterpoint
to that disillusionment."
'
"
5
106. Senate Approves $22-billion Crime Bill, TAMPA TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at 1A
(quoting Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)).
107. E.g., Sam Vincent Meddis & Robert Davis, Poll: Get Tougher on Crime, USA
TODAY, Oct. 28, 1993, at 1.
108. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Can We Afford the Bill of Rights?, 129 MIL. L. REv. 1
(1990).
109. Jill Smolowe, Danger in the Safety Zone, TIME, Aug. 23, 1993, at 29.
110. TIME reported: "Fear [of crime] has led to a boom in the security industry and
the transformation of homes and public places into fortresses." Id.
111. See generally Robert Gerloff, Public Space Minus the Public, UTNE READER,
Jan.IFeb. 1993, at 46.
112. Deflating Bureaucratic Bloat, supra note 99.
113. In a 1993 Gallup poll only 8% of Americans expressed a "great deal" of confi-
dence in Congress. In the same poll, only 19% expressed that level of confidence in the
President, but 32% expressed such confidence in the military. See David W. Moore & Frank
Newport, Confidence in Institutions: Military Still Tops The List, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY,
Apr. 1993, at 22, 23.
114. Ruby, supra note 88, at 64; see also Robert J. Bresler, Politics of Dissatisfaction,
USA TODAY MAG., Nov. 1993, at 5.
115. Steven V. Roberts & Bruce Auster, Colin Powell, Superstar, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 20, 1993, at 48, 49.
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B. The Military as Deliverer
The transfer of public confidence from the elected leaders to the mil-
itary challenges civilian control of the armed forces. Specifically, Finer
argued that, as confidence in politicians and the civil process weakens, an
intervening military is deemed a "deliverer." 116 That appears to be the
case today. James Fallows captured the sentiment of many Americans
when, after contrasting the military's efficiency with the failures of civil-
ian government, he declared, "I am beginning to think that the only way
the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a secur-
ity threat and turn the job over to the military. 11 7
Granting the military the responsibility for the general national wel-
fare under the aegis of "national security" is a major expansion of its
customary function. National security ordinarily includes "only those ac-
tivities of the Government that are directly concerned with the protection
of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not
those which contribute to the strength of the Nation only through their
impact on the general welfare."'"" In that context, the military's primary
security responsibility is "to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise. ' ' 19
Even with the historical separation of military functions from domes-
tic issues, political leaders have long recognized the motivating effect of
martial rhetoric."0 Despite the bellicose language and the allocation of
tremendous resources, a range of economic and social problems stub-
bornly defy civilian solution. In response, exasperated politicians have re-
116. Finer stated:
[A] decline of confidence in the politicians and civil processes is liable to en-
hance the popularity of the military. By the same token, it weakens the author-
ity of the civilian regime and renders it an easier prey to the intervention of the
[military], which, in these circumstances, comes to be regarded as a deliverer.
FINER, supra note 24, at 73.
117. James Fallows, Military Efficiency, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1991, at 18. He ex-
plained his reasoning:
According to our economic and political theories, most agencies of the govern-
ment have no special standing to speak about the general national welfare. Each
represents a certain constituency; the interest groups fight it out. The military,
strangely, is the one government institution that has been assigned legitimacy to
act on its notion of the collective good. "National defense" can make us do
things-train engineers, build highways-that long-term good of the nation or
common sense cannot.
Id.
118. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 544 (1955).
119. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
120. For example, President Johnson had his "War on Poverty." Guy Gugliotta, War
on Poverty, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1993, at Al. President Carter termed his drive for energy
self-sufficiency "the moral equivalent of war," Tilak Doshi, Twenty Years After the First
Oil Shock, Bus. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at 1, and President Reagan declared a "War on
Drugs." John Dillin, U.S. Drug Fight: The Focus Shifts to Home Front, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 3, 1993, at 3. President Bush era advocates of educational reform equated
the desperate status to which schools have been allowed to decline as "an act of war" Hen-
rik Bering-Jensen, Rebel for Cause of School Reform, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 1991, at El.
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placed militant oratory with the actual dispatch of military troops to fight
civic wars.
V. THE NEW ROLES
Beginning in the 1980's, Congress significantly enlarged the scope of
the armed services' domestic duties.121 Such assignments are not com-
pletely new. In the early days of the Republic, military personnel served
as explorers, built roads and bridges, and gave the nation its cadre of
trained engineers.' 2 ' Further, the military countered civil disturbances at
various times, 123 and engaged in law enforcement duties in the South dur-
ing Reconstruction. 124 Law enforcement responsibilities were,, however,
largely abandoned following the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in
1878.125 For the next century the military successfully avoided assuming
regular police duties."16
The one-hundred-year hiatus ended with the drug crisis of the
1980's. Discouraged by the inability of police departments to stop illegal
drugs from flooding the country, Congress enacted the Military Support
for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act in 1981.117 Originally in-
tended merely to strengthen interdiction efforts, the military's responsi-
bility evolved into a $1.2 billion program 12 that includes regular patrols
121. For a discussion of the recent expansion of the military's domestic duties as a
response to the drug problem, see infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
122. Samuel P. Huntington, New Contingencies, Old Roles, JOINT FORCE Q., Autumn
1993, at 38, 39; see also William Rosenau, Nontraditional Missions and the Future of the
U.S. Military, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 31, 39-45 Winter/Spring 1994.
123. See generally Engdahl, supra note 21 (discussing the use of the military to sup-
press domestic disorders).
124. See Engdahl, supra note 21, at 55-64 (discussing the use of the military as law
enforcement after the Civil War).
125. The Posse Comitatus Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988) (original version at ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878)).
126. For background to the Posse Comitatus Act, see United States v. Hartley, 486 F.
Supp. 1348, 1356 n. 11 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Engdahl, supra note 21, at 62-65. Though techni-
cally applying only to the Army and the Air Force, by regulation the Act also governs the
Navy. See H.R. REP. No. 71, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1785, 1787.
127. Congress enacted a series of laws in the 1980's delineating military cooperation
with civilian law enforcement authorities which are found in Title 10, U.S.C., Chapter 18.
See Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1099,
1115 (1981), amended by National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-456,
§ 1104(a), 102 Stat. 1918, 2043 (1988); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1216(a), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1352, 1569 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 371-380 (1988)); see also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5525.5. DoD
COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (1986).
128. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE ALMANAC 93, at 18 (1993) [hereinafter DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE ALMANAC].
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in certain high-crime neighborhoods 129 and along borders. 130 Desperate
politicians want to deploy even more troops to police their cities."31
With more than 5,000 troops conducting law enforcement activities
throughout the country on any given day,1 3 2 America is witnessing the
beginning of what it never has had before: 33 a national uniformed police
agency. This is a fundamental departure from United States law enforce-
ment philosophy and one of import to civilian control. Professor Steven
Wisotsky explained the problems created by a national police force:
The constitution makes the president commander-in-chief, thus cen-
tralizing control of all the armed forces in one person. Police, by con-
trast, are supposed to enforce the law, primarily against domestic
threats at the city, county, and state levels. They thus are subject to
local control by the tens of thousands of communities throughout the
nation.13
Morris Janowitz has argued that the professional military resisted identi-
fying itself with local police forces because of, among other factors, the
impact on civilian control. "Civilian supremacy in the United States," Ja-
nowitz noted, "has rested on the assumption that its national military
forces were organized and controlled separately from the local and more
decentralized police forces." 35
Of perhaps greater concern, Congress did not limit the expansion of
military responsibilities in the civilian sector to policing. The National
Defense Authorization Act for 1993 included legislation allowing the
armed forces to engage in a wide range of activities once the exclusive
129. The Washington Times reported that since 1989 District of Columbia National
Guardsmen operated floodlights in known drug markets, conducted surveillance flights over
the city, boarded up drug houses, and performed administrative functions in support of the
D.C. police. The National Guard as Political Football, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1993, at 20.
Another non-emergency use of military troops in a policing role occurred in December 1992
during a four-day crackdown on crime in public housing complexes in Sumter, S.C. See
William Matthews, How Guard Helped Cut Local Crime, AIR FORCE TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at
4.
130. See, e.g., Glenn F. Bunting, Plan for National Guard at Border Gains Support,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at A3.
131. The mayor of the District of Columbia asked President Clinton to order National
Guard troops to patrol high crime Washington neighborhoods even though the city already
has the highest police-to-citizen ratio in the country. Fever Line, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 8, 1993, at 23. A similar proposal was made by a Los Angeles councilman. See John
Leo, The New Highwaymen, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 27, 1993, at 18.
132. New Civilian Tasks for the Military (Ctr. for Def. Info. broadcast, Apr. 11, 1993).
133. To be sure, the military has intervened to quell domestic disorders but it has long
resisted, especially in the twentieth century, any suggestion of a permanent police function
in part because of a fear that to do so would "fan the flames of antimilitarism." See Jerry
M. Cooper, Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders, in THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 120, 142-43 (Rich-
ard H. Kohn ed., 1991).
134. Steven Wisotsky, The War on Drugs and Civil Liberties, USA T ODAY MAG., July
1993, at 17, 19.
135. JANOWITZ, supra note 62, at 419.
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province of local civilian authorities.1 36 Specifically, the Civil-Military Co-
operative Action Program 1 7 encouraged the use of the "skills, capabili-
ties, and resources of the armed forces to assist civilian efforts to meet the
needs of the United States. 1 38 The military now involves itself in local
schools, 39 the provision of medical care to underserved communities,
140
infrastructure construction and repair projects,' 4' environmental restora-
tion,142 youth programs,'143 and more. It also has played a much more ag-
gressive role in disaster relief activities,14 especially following Hurricanes
Hugo and Andrew, after which thousands of active duty soldiers sup-
planted the role of civilian agencies.
145
The new domestic operations are enormously popular with the pub-
lic. Americans apparently no longer entertain what the Supreme Court
declared in 1972 was "a traditional and strong resistance to any military
intrusion in civilian affairs."4- To the contrary, beleaguered residents of
drug-plagued neighborhoods welcome soldiers into the community."47 Af-
136. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 102-484,
106 Stat. 2315 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. §§ 113-2825 (1988)).
137. Id. § 1081(b), 106 Stat. at 2514 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)).
138. Id.
139. For example, since October 1992 an Army program served 20,000 students in thir-
teen states. Darlene Smith, Army Expands Science, Math Student Program, ARMY TI ES,
Oct. 11, 1993, at 28. Due to a 1992 congressional authorization to expand the existing pro-
gram, the number of Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps programs is expected to double,
reaching over 318,000 students over the age of fourteen. See Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., Junior
R.O.T.C.? Who Needs It?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1993, at 10.
140. Department of Defense, President Clinton Directs Release of $57.5 Million to
National Guard for Urban and Rural Youth Pilot Programs (News Release No. 271-93,
June 11, 1993).
141. See, e.g., Vago Muradian, Meet the Playground Squadron, AIR FORCE TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 22.
142. See Miles Harvey, Eco-Warriors: Can the Military Be Our First Line of Environ-
mental Defense?, UTNE READER, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 17. ,
143. Television journalist Jim Cummins reported a $44 million, five-month, military-
run "boot camp" program for high school dropouts that provided an opportunity to earn a
high school diploma while developing self-discipline and cooperation. NBC Nightly News
(NBC television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993).
144. The military is authorized to furnish domestic disaster assistance by the Stafford
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1988), and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ 2251-2303 (1988). See also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3025.1: MILITARY
SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (1993); DEPARTMENT OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3025.12: EMPLOYMENT
OF MILITARY RESOURCES IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES (1971).
145. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISASTER ASSISTANCE: DoD's SUPPORT FOR
HURRICANES ANDREW AND INIKI AND TYPHOON OMAR 15 (1993). The GAO reported that "DoD
provided much of the food, water, sheltering, transportation, and medical care, even though
the Federal Response Plan assigns those responsibilities to other agencies." Id.
146. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (involving a suit by the subjects of Army
surveillance during the 1960's as a part of an Army attempt to collect information on per-
sons who might have caused domestic civil disturbances). For a discussion of Laird in con-
text, see Paul Myf. Peterson, Civilian Demonstrations Near the Military Installation:
Restraints on Military Surveillance and Other Activities, 140 MIL. L. REV. 113, 120-21
(1993).
147. See A Cry From the Capital, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1993, at 18. The
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ter civilian relief organizations failed, disaster victims hailed the arrival of
the military, demonstrating once again that the antimilitarism of the Vi-
etnam era is gone.
14
8
Although a few officials grumble that given the Department of De-
fense's new domestic agenda, it should be renamed the "Department of
Defense, Health, Education and Welfare,' ' 149 an increasing number of mil-
itary leaders greet the new functions with enthusiasm. Some see the new
roles as a way to preserve military force structure in the austere budget-
ary environment of the post-Cold War era.150 Others view the new assign-
ments as a proper use of military strength. For example, one senior
leader, Admiral Paul David Miller, Commander-in-Chief of United States
Atlantic Command, envisions military personnel employed in a wide vari-
ety of domestic construction and infrastructure repair projects, as well as
a myriad of social service programs.' 51
A. Impact of the New Roles on Civilian Control
How does the increasing military involvement in nontraditional mis-
sions undermine civilian control of the military? Why are such activities
more threatening today than in the past? The answers are manifold.
First, before the Cold War, the peacetime militaries performing do-
mestic assignments were small and relatively weak compared to the rest
of American society. Despite the end of the Cold War, today's military is
the largest peacetime force in United States history that does not face an
overarching external threat.' 52 The impact of the unprecedented concen-
tration of martial energy on American society and its potentially vulnera-
ble political systems is uncertain at best.
Second, as noted above, the military's role in domestic activities has
become more formalized and legitimized. 5 3 Unlike earlier eras, specific
Christian Science Monitor reported that the proposal to use troops in a police mode in
Washington "is very popular" in the neighborhoods affected. Id.
148. Harry Crumpacker, A Military Overhaul, TAMPA TRm.-TntEs, Nov. 14, 1993, at 6.
He observed:
As has been pointed out by others, one solid indication of how far the armed
forces have come [since Vietnam] is the reaction of American citizens faced with
recent natural disasters. No one who watched the Airborne arrive in Homestead
[following Hurricane Andrew] could doubt for a second that those citizens
wanted soldiers on the scene as fast as possible. So did the Midwest flood
victims.
Id.
149. Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1993, at 1.
150. See, e.g., Capt. J.F. Kelly, USN (Ret.), U.S. Needs Military to Fight "Wars" at
Home, NAvY TiXMEs, Aug. 16, 1993, at 37.
151. PAUL D. MILLER, BOTH SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES 38 (1992) (unpublished Inst. for
Foreign Pol'y Analysis, Nat'l Security Paper No. 10).
152. Admiral Crowe, whose 45-year career ended in 1989 observed that his profes-
sional life spanned an "era when American foreign and military policy was shaped by a
single factor: the challenge of the Soviet Union." CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 320.
153. For a discussion of the expanded domestic role of the military, see supra notes
121-51 and accompanying text.
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legislation now facilitates military involvement in domestic areas. 15 4 The
legislation finds official expression in military mission statements and
doctrinal manuals. 15
5
Third, the coalescing of the all-volunteer military has challenged ci-
vilian control. Not only is the military undiluted by the civilianizing ef-
fect of conscription, it is also-after Goldwater-Nichols-a much more
unified force. Specifically, the law attempted to minimize the deleterious
effect of interservice rivalries 56 by emphasizing "jointness," that is, forc-
ing the separate military services to operate corporately. According to for-
mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, the
"overarching aim of jointness is to expand officers' loyalties from a single
service to the military as a whole.'
1 57
When the "joint" imperative of Goldwater-Nichols combines with fis-
cally driven consolidations, gigantic military conglomerates of disturbing
potential arise.118 For example, though virtually unreported in the media,
the United States recently formed a supercommand: U.S. Atlantic Com-
mand (USACOM). In the early fall of 1993 over 1.2 million
troops-nearly all the military forces based in the continental United
States-were reorganized under the control of USACOM, a joint military
organization answerable to a single uniformed officer. 59 USACOM not
only is America's largest military command; it also is the organization
primarily responsible for the new array of domestic assignments. For ex-
ample, USACOM responds to civil disorders. 6 0 Thus, a military leader
whose control over the United States military is second only to the presi-
dent must study and plan operations to take control of American cities in
crises. In short, the military force that concerns itself with domestic af-
fairs is larger, more focused, and more united than ever before.
The fourth factor that differentiates the current military involvement
from that of earlier eras is the increased politicization of today's armed
services. Clearly, an apolitical military complements and sustains civilian
control. Chief Justice Burger opined in Greer v. Spock'6 that the "200-
year tradition of keeping the military separate from political affairs...
is a constitutional corollary to the express provision for civilian control of
154. For a discussion of particular legislation, see supra notes 127 and 136 and accom-
panying text.
155. For example, "combatting drugs" is now officially a "high national defense mis-
sion" of the U.S. armed forces. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES 15 (1992). Similarly, the new Field Manual 100-5, the Army's basic doc-
trine treatise, contains for the first time a chapter on nontraditional missions. DEPARTMENT
OF ARMY, FM100-5 OPERATIONS 13-0 to 13-8 (1993).
156. For a discussion of interservice rivalries, see JANOWITZ, supra note 62, at 350-56.
157. CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 148.
158. Congress historically opposed "excessive unification" of the armed forces specifi-
cally because it feared an overconcentration of military power would weaken civilian control.
See JANowrrz, supra note 62, at 356.
159. See William Matthews, New Command Replaces LANTCOM, ARMY TIMES, Oct.
11, 1993, at 11.
160. Id.
161. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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the military. ' 162 In the United States, law and policy are supposed to en-
sure political neutrality.16 3 Nevertheless, as the United States military
adapts to the needs of the country in a time of budget constraints and
few external threats, the traditional apolitical stance has diminished.
The current politicization of the military is another vestige of the
Vietnam War. One theory partially attributes the defeat in Vietnam to
the failure of the military leadership to assert themselves and their views
more forcefully in the political realm.164 Profoundly affected by that expe-
rience, 5 military officers developed the skills and determination to effec-
tively express themselves in such fora. Thus, military leaders eroded the
customary practice of privately expressing disagreement with civilian
leaders, if at all. Forrest Pogue, the biographer of General George C. Mar-
shall, explained the traditional thinking:
[Marshall] believed that military men had a duty to explain the needs
of their services and the requirements of their forces to carry out as-
signments directed by the President. A responsible officer had the right
to question a policy he considered wrong or mistaken and to discuss
thoroughly a proposal. But there was no right to challenge publicly the
wishes of the Commander-in-Chief.1 6
To many in the military, the lesson of Vietnam holds that a discreet
approach to confronting political authority is outmoded. Admiral Crowe
observed that few officers today achieve higher rank "without a firm grasp
of international relations, congressional politics, and public affairs.'
'16 7
Accordingly, today's officers are intellectually prepared to challenge polit-
ical leaders, particularly when they believe military interests are at
162. Id. at 842 (Burger, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the Constitution
and the apolitical tradition of the military, see supra note 15.
163. Military officers may not hold civil office. 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2) (1988). There is a
limited exception allowing officers to hold a nonpartisan civil office on a school board lo-
cated on a military reservation. Id. § 973(c) (Supp. IV 1992). Enlisted personnel may hold
specified nonpartisan elected offices. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. DIRECTIVE 1344.10 (1990); see
also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, JOINT ETHICS REGULATION (1993). However, 1993 legislation
relaxed the restrictions imposed on the political activities of three million federal civilian
workers, of whom Department of Defense employees constitute the largest group. See Hatch
Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001 (1993). They may now
take an active part in partisan political campaigns, hold office in political parties, and solicit
contributions under certain circumstances. Id. Though an attempt by Senator John McCain
to apply the liberalized provisions to the military was defeated, it remains indisputable that
the military will be operating in a much more politicized environment than ever before. See
Politics and the Military, AIR FORCE TIMES, Aug. 9, 1993, at 26.
164. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 59, at 45-46, 201-02.
165. Morris Janowitz argued that the "frustrations" of limited warfare further exposed
career officers to the interrelationship of political and military factors. JANOWITZ, supra note
62, at 436.
166. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall on Civil-Military Relationships, in THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 194
(Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991) (emphasis added); see also CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53,
at 342.
167. CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 23. See also supra note 263 and accompany-
ing text.
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risk.168 Moreover, the new military assertiveness especially politicizes the
relationship with the weakened civilian political institutions." 9
In addition to the military response to Vietnam, protest groups ironi-
cally prompted politicization as well. During the Vietnam conflict, public
demonstrations and similar activities wrongly targeted the military itself.
Military analyst Harry Summers explained: "By attacking the executors
of Vietnam policy rather than the makers of that policy, the protestors
were striking at the very heart of our democratic system-civilian control
of the military.' 7 0 By challenging the military itself, the critics induced
public responses from the armed forces. The protestors thus legitimized
military expression on partisan issues.
The politicization of the military that followed the Vietnam War con-
tinues today. For example, opponents of the military's homosexual exclu-
sion policy have challenged military recruiters and education programs on
many university campuses.' 7 1 Thrust into the political debate by these
and other actions directed at the uniformed ranks, the armed services
have defended themselves publicly.'7 2 The public defense led to open
clashes with civilian leaders when the Clinton Administration sought to
change the policy. The public disputes inescapably politicize the partici-
pants, including the military.
17 3
Another, even more disturbing development in the politicization of
the military is illustrated by the circumstances surrounding the selection
of General Colin Powell's successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Gay rights organizations reportedly undermined the candidacy of
General Joseph P. Hoar of the Marine Corps. 17 4 Although General Hoar
was not involved in any wrongdoing, he enforced the homosexual exclu-
sion policy during a tour as commander of the Marine Corps Recruit De-
168. It is one thing to debate the merits of the conduct of an overseas military opera-
tion, and quite another to argue about the propriety of a strategy to combat a domestic ill.
Nevertheless, once the "mission" is redefined to equate the solving of domestic problems
with the conduct of war, such debates are inevitable. For example, if the armed forces are
tasked to improve education, the military inevitably will find itself critiquing the role of the
teachers and the content of curriculum, both of which are political matters best reserved to
the voters and their elected leaders.
169. Professor Huntington explained:
"The extent to which military institutions and individuals become politicized is
a function of the weakness of civilian political organizations and the inability of
civilian political leaders to deal with the principal policy problems facing the
country." SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 221
(1968).
170. SUMMERS, VIETNAM WAR, supra note 60, at 28.
171. See, e.g., Tom Philip, CSUS May End ROTC Over Anti-Gay Policy, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 15, 1992, at 1. For a discussion regarding the legality of bans on military
recruiters, see United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
172. See MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE
(1993). Wells-Petry, a major in the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, presented nu-
merous arguments against permitting gays to serve in the military. See id.
173. See Otto Kreisher, Congressional Critics Stall Clinton's 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 4, 1994, at A8.
174. See generally David Martin, Landing the Eagle, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 1993, at 150.
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pot, Parris Island.17 5 The complainants apparently ignored the fact that
the homosexual policy is ultimately a matter decided not by military
commanders but by civilian leaders.'
The misguided activists send the military community a troubling
message. In effect they suggest that the defiance of the policies of civilian
authorities by military commanders is appropriate. The activists imply
that military officers should condition their actions not on the lawful dic-
tates of the civilian leadership, but on their own assessment of the pre-
sent-and future-political climate. Given the military's intensifying
involvement in domestic activities, the potential arises for military of-
ficers to defy or subvert the directives of the civilian leadership when
they decide that the civilian leadership is out of step with fashionable
thinking.
The fifth reason for concern about the loss of civilian control is the
evolution of the civilian authorities. The leadership responsible for civil-
ian control of the military is fundamentally different in contemporary
America than it was in earlier periods. In fact, the civilian leadership now
bears little resemblance in background to the military that it must con-
trol. This development is discussed in more detail below.
B. The Rise of the Meritocratic Leadership Class
Paralleling the transformation of the military and its role in Ameri-
can society is the evolution of the United States civilian leadership. The
assumption of power by the Clinton Administration was hailed as the ar-
rival of the Meritocratic Class.1" Defined as "those who rise economically
and socially largely because of superior education rather than because
they are propelled by external forces like family wealth or pedigree,"'1 8
the Meritocratic Class differs from previous leadership elites in an impor-
tant way: Its members rarely serve in the military.179
Yet again the influence of Vietnam is evident. When America with-
drew from Vietnam in 1973, Congress ended conscription. 180 Though mil-
lions still serve in the all-volunteer force, sociologist Charles Moskos has
insisted that military service is no longer a rite of passage for American
politicians. 81 The reason, of course, is partly statistical. The World War
II generation-until quite recently the principal source of national leader-
ship-saw eight of ten age-eligible males serve in the military. By 1995,
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1670.
177. Paul Glastris, Life Among the "Meritocrats," U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 30,
1993, at 30.
178. Id.
179. See Nicholas Lemann, The Curse of the Meritocratic Class, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,
1992, at B4.
180. Eliot A. Cohen, After the Battle: A Defense Primer for the Next Century, NEw
REPUBLIC, Apr. 1991, at 19.
181. Moskos, supra note 90, at 83, 86-87.
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however, only one in ten will serve. 18 2 Moreover, thousands of women are
entering leadership positions. If women continue to comprise only a small
portion of the armed services, the likelihood of persons with military ex-
perience assuming key posts diminishes even further.
8 3
Few of the new leaders in the Clinton Administration can claim mili-
tary experience on their resum6s. Forty-seven percent of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's appointments went to women, who are less likely to have
military experience than men; of the approximately 1,000 male designees,
only about ten percent are veterans-even though approximately one-
third would reflect the percentage in the population. 8 4 However, military
experience counts. For example, in Chappell v. Wallace, 85 the Supreme
Court noted that the framers of the Constitution anticipated the issues in
the case because many "had recently experienced the rigors of military
life and were well aware of the differences between it and civilian life."' 80
Similarly, Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, an ex-Marine and a relent-
less critic of the military, stated, "I was a ground-pounder . . .I under-
stand what the human condition is in the military.' ' 8 7 An understanding
based on personal experience is rare among the Meritocrats.
Ironically, the military is itself a meritocracy, but a very different one
from that which produces the Meritocratic Class now assuming power. In
the armed forces, advancement is based largely on the demonstrated abil-
ity to succeed in often difficult environments through the orchestration of
a complex amalgam of people and machines. The Meritocratic Class, on
the other hand, tends to overemphasize IQ and academic credentials at
the expense of practical experience backed by proven results. 8 Mer-
itocratic elites revel in the sophisticated repartee of Washington think
tanks and university conferences, but may stumble when tasked to imple-
ment the theories discussed.8 9
Popular opinion considers many Meritocrats "anti-military." Sup-
ported by oft-reported (and perhaps apocryphal) slights to military per-
sonnel, some contend that as "baby boomers" take positions of leadership
they bring with them Vietnam-era animosity toward the armed ser-
vices.190 Vietnam veteran John Wheeler argued that "the Clinton Admin-
182. Id. at 86-87.
183. Women comprise less than 11% of the military. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
DEFENSE ALMANAC, supra note 128, at 30 (1993). Since the pool of potential women veterans
is small, the likelihood of a female civilian leader having military experience is similarly
reduced.
184. David S. Broder, Clinton's Civilians, WASH. PosT, Nat'l Wkly. Ed., Jan. 3-9, 1994,
at 4.
185. 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (holding that enlisted military personnel may not main-
tain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations).
186. Id. at 300.
187. Pat Towell, The Dellums Agenda, AIR FORCE MAG., July 1993, at 46, 50.
188. E.g., Thomas E. Ricks & Michael K. Frisby, How Inman Could Go From Star to
"Bizarre" In Such a Short Time, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1994, at Al.
189. See generally David Ignatius, The Curse of the Merit Class, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27,
1994, at Cl.
190. See, e.g., Steven D. Stark, Anti-Military Generation Takes Office, L.A. TIMES
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istration is largely a networked clique of people who were anti-military
and anti-war during the 1960's and carry their biases with them still."'191
While antimilitarism is undoubtedly a factor, it appears that the
Meritocratic Class suffers more from ignorance about the military than
from antimilitary bigotry. As military service becomes increasingly rare
among the general population and as military education programs disap-
pear from many college campuses, 192 few opportunities allow for contact
with anyone associated with the armed forces. Richard G. Miles, an Army
reservist who attended the Georgetown University School of Foreign Ser-
vice, wrote that his classmates were singularly unacquainted with military
matters. 9 ' He contended that their ignorance, which he believed was not
motivated by "some sort of militant pacifism or left-wing prejudice,"
would be "comical if it weren't for the fact that Georgetown grads end up
in high places, including the presidency.' 9 4 He added that "[a]lthough
some students with a military background can occasionally be found at
schools like Georgetown, they are vastly outnumbered by those who have
had no personal contact whatsoever with those who serve in the U.S.
armed forces."""
Other commentators share similar views of the public's declining un-
derstanding of the military. "When it comes to the study of military af-
fairs," A.J. Bacevich noted in National Review, "the attitudes of the
baby-boomers now moving into dominant circles in government, media,
and the academy run the gamut from uninterested to ignorant."'' 9
Whether such a cavalier attitude by the Meritocratic elites towards the
military is sufficient to ensure civilian control is questionable. It depends
in large measure upon the strength of the institutions of civilian control
that they will lead.
VI. THE DECLINE OF THE SAFEGUARDS FOR CIVILIAN
CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
In Professor Huntington's analysis of subjective civilian control of
the military, he emphasized the vitality of the civilian institutions and
the constitutional forms expected to exercise that control. The following
section examines key institutions and forms of civilian control in the
United States to determine if their strength in relation to the military is
ebbing.
(Wash. Ed.), May 6, 1993, at 4.
191. See Broder, supra note 184 (quoting John Wheeler).
192. For example, in the last decade Reserve Officer Training Corps programs ended
on over 100 campuses. See Carlton W. Meyer, Separate ROTCs Are Unnecessary, AiR
FoRCE TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at 39.
193. Richard G. Miles, Those Who Fight, Those Who Decide, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22,
1993, at 12.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Bacevich, supra note 4, at 36. Bacevich is executive director of the Foreign Policy
Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Id.
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A. The Judiciary
A division of power among the branches of government and the ac-
companying system of checks and balances is central to the constitutional
scheme of civilian control of the military. By design, the courts are the
least influential element in the scheme.197 The judiciary realizes that con-
trol of the armed forces is essentially a political matter best left to the
politicians. In Gilligan v. Morgan," "' the Supreme Court stated: "It would
be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental ac-
tion that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political
branches directly responsible-as the judicial branch is not-to the elec-
toral process."1 99
When the political branches act, the courts usually defer. In Solario
v. United States,200 the Court noted that "[]udicial deference is at its
apogee" when Congress' authority to govern the military is challenged.
20 1
Not only does the desire to defer to the electoral process motivate the
courts, they also recognize that the judiciary lacks expertise in military
affairs. The Court has emphasized the point:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a
military force are essentially military judgements, subject always to the
civilian control of the legislative and executive branches.202
Once the elected branches assign the military a mission, the Court
readily gives military authorities considerable discretion to execute the
task. For example, the Supreme Court declared in Orloff v. Willoughby,20 3
"Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous
not to intervene in judicial matters."' 20 4 Similarly, in Goldman v. Wein-
197. Millett cited three contributions of the judiciary to the concept of civilian control
of the military:
(1) restraining the use of martial law and military action by regular forces in
civil disturbances;
(2) protecting the civil liberties of civilians (both American and foreign) from
military abuses during times of war; and
(3) extending to American servicemen the same set of individual legal protec-
tions provided civilians in the federal court system.
MmLEr, supra note 2, at 18.
198. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
199. Id. at 4.
200. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
201. Id. at 447 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). However,
"[n]one of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in
the area of military affairs." See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67-68.
202. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 4; see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 96 (1976);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975).
203. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
204. Id. at 93-94.
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berger,20 5 the Court stated that the judiciary "must give great deference
to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the rela-
tive importance of a particular military interest.
20 6
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its deference to the elected
branches of government in Weiss v. United States, 207 in which it ap-
proved Congress' scheme for the appointment of military judges. Another
issue, not yet before the Court but almost certain to reach it, is the con-
stitutionality of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy relating to gays in the
military.28 In one sense a decision supporting the individuals challenging
the government policy would seem to enhance the role of the judiciary as
a means of civilian control. But in another, perhaps more important way,
such decisions would undermine it.
Significantly, the policy concerning gays in the military is the prod-
uct of a collaborative effort between the executive branch and Con-
gress-the two key institutions of civilian control. Arguably, if an
individual military member can defeat the combined wills of the elected
branches of government, the ability of those branches to control the
armed services becomes vulnerable. The military is an organization in
which the essence of service "is the subordination of the desires and in-
terests of the individual. '20 9 Any action that promotes the rights of an
individual over his or her civilian masters by definition erodes the latter's
authority.
The courts, never expected to play a strong role in controlling the
military, have not significantly checked military power as they have with
other government powers. More often than not, the courts protect mili-
tary interests from attempts by civilian entities to interfere with military
205. 475 U.S. 508 (1986).
206. Id. at 509. The case upheld the right of the Air Force to prohibit an officer from
wearing a yarmulke while in uniform. Congress undermined the effect of the decision by
enacting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-180, § 508(a)(2), 101 Stat. 1019, 1086 (1987) (codified in 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988)),
which authorizes the wearing of religious apparel in uniform except under certain limited
circumstances. The Court earlier had upheld the exclusion of a civilian political candidate
from a military base by noting that "nothing in the Constitution disables a military com-
mander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline,
or morale of troops" on his base. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 844 (1976) (emphasis added).
207. 114 S. Ct. 752 (1993). There are over 300 trailer cases raising the same issue. See
Miriam Chapman, Do Military Judges Pass Constitutional Muster?, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1993,
at 28 n.18. For a further discussion of the appointment of military judges, see Jonathan
Lurie, Presidential Preferences and Aspiring Appointees: Selections to the U.S. Court of
Military Appeals 1951-1968, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 521 (1994).
208. Current litigation primarily involves a prior policy which excluded homosexuals
on status as well as behavior grounds. "Don't ask, don't tell" is a euphemism to describe the
new policy that focuses on conduct alone. The policy resulted from a compromise achieved
by the Clinton Administration and Congress. The Administration decided to forego litigat-
ing the merits of the old policy to await challenges to the new one. See generally John
Lancaster, Administration Decision Not to Defend Homosexual Ban Is a Retreat of Sorts,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 31, 1993, at 12. See also supra note 96.
209. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953).
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activities. Courts avoid confrontation with the military210 and plainly con-
sider responsibility for civilian control of the military to lie principally
with the executive and legislative branches. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, if the judiciary will depart from the traditional view when faced
with the highly controversial issue of gays in the military.
B. The Executive
The Constitution assigns the bulk of power over the military to the
executive and legislative branches.2 ' In the division of power, the desig-
nation of the President as Commander-in-Chief 2 establishes the execu-
tive2 13 as an indispensable element of civilian control.214 Furthermore, the
enormous pressures of World War II and the Cold War enhanced the pri-
macy of the President in military affairs. The time-sensitive decisionmak-
ing of the nuclear age fosters the centralization of control of military
forces in the person of the President.2 5 Thus, the American system of
civilian control of the military relies on strong leadership from the Com-
mander-in-Chief. As General Bruce Palmer, Jr. observed:
In our system of government, the president, with his dual role as civil-
ian chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is the
indispensable key to national security. For the president to control the
armed forces, he must command them .... The president is the com-
mander-in-chief and there is no substitute for his forceful and visible
leadership in discharging this supreme command function over the De-
partment of Defense and the armed forces.1 6
Despite the traditional deference to the President and in yet another
legacy of Vietnam, Congress challenged the President's authority to exer-
cise supreme command over the armed forces. The 1973 War Powers Res-
olution," 7 born of concern for the long-term commitment of American
210. Professor Lurie argued that "judges have tried to avoid confrontations with the
military, resulting during World War II, for example,. . . [in] decisions that cannot be rec-
onciled with American standards of due process." See Lurie, supra note 33, at 145.
211. See generally Pablo Ruiz-Tagle, Reflections on the Origins of American Military
Institutions, 2 U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J. LEGAL STUn. 113 (1991).
212. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
213. The Constitution obliges the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
214. Professor Graebner believed the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief
flows more from the "access to the public mind" than from any constitutional designation.
Norman A. Graebner, The President as Commander-in-Chief: A Study in Power, J. Mm.
HIsT., Jan. 1993, at 111, 127-32. Millett believed that the Constitution intended Congress to
be the more influential actor. MILLETT, supra note 2, at 7.
215. Howard E. Shuman argued that "the public, as well as politicians and pundits,
generally accepts the powerful modern Presidency as necessary in a dangerous world." How-
ard E. Shuman, Preface to THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY xvii (Howard E.
Schuman & Walter R. Thomas eds., 1990).
216. PALMER, supra note 59, at 201.
217. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1988)).
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troops to hostile situations abroad, requires congressional approval of op-
erations within specified time limits. According to Professor Norman A.
Graebner, Congress sought to restore "the balance between the Presi-
dent's control of the armed forces and the right of Congress to determine
their use."2 " Nonetheless, no president has accepted the constitutionality
of the Resolution, and no court has ever decided the issue.2 119 Whenever
the Resolution seems to apply, Congress and the President strike an ac-
commodation that allows both branches to insist on the correctness of
their view.2 0
Unresolved, however, is the proper course for a military commander
of a future operation in which an understanding between Congress and
the President is not reached. The implications for civilian control are
grave. Richard Kohn argued that if the branches of government responsi-
ble for civilian control of the military "are in such conflict that they defy
each other, the U.S. military can be put in a position in which civilian
control-even the Constitution itself-is in jeopardy."22 1
The War Powers Resolution is a classic illustration in the military
context of what Edward S. Corwin called "the invitation to struggle" 222
that is intrinsic to the Constitution's fabric. 223 The concept, which em-
braces the balance of power between the legislative and executive
branches of government, may serve a proper purpose for the apportion-
ment of other responsibilities of government. However, it does not serve
the needs of a military commander enmeshed in an overseas operation
who faces conflicting demands from the Commander-in-Chief and the
Congress.2" Moreover, the uncertainty that marks the seam between
218. Graebner, supra note 214, at 111, 131.
219. See generally John W. Rolph, The Decline and Fall of the War Powers Resolu-
tion: Waging War Under the Constitution After Desert Storm, 43 MERCER L. REV. 645
(1992) (discussing flaws of the War Powers Resolution); Ellen C. Collier, War Powers Reso-
lution: Presidential Compliance, CONG. RES. SERV. IsSUE BRIEF (Jul. 29, 1991) (discussing
several recent incidents in which U.S. troops were deployed abroad).
220. A recent example is the Senate's refusal to limit the President's powers to send
troops to Haiti as part of a plan to facilitate the return to the island of Haitian president
Jean-Betrand Aristide. See Helen Dewar, Clinton and Congress Cease Fire, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 1992, at 26.
221. KOHN, supra note 17, at 8.
222. Shuman, supra note 215, at xv (quoting Edward S. Corwin).
223. Millett asserted: "Since there has never been any particularly peaceful equilib-
rium in exercising civilian control between the president and Congress, it is silly to expect
any. The Constitution in essence forbids it." MILLETr, supra note 2, at 60.
224. For example, if the President as Commander-in-Chief orders the continued de-
ployment of troops in a hostile situation in defiance of a congressional mandate to the con-
trary, what is a military commander to do? Professors Kemp and Hudlin suggest that the
commander would likely follow the orders of the President. See Kemp & Hudlin, supra note
10, at 10-11. Regardless of the disposition, such a precedent would permanently alter con-
cepts of civilian control in this country. The "losing" party would forever know the military
can spurn its direction. The authority of at least one of the two primary institutions of
civilian control would be eviscerated. Thus, even a single significant incident undermining
civilian control could dramatically alter the American political tradition. As historian Rich-
ard H. Kohn warned:
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presidential and congressional authority225 creates what in military terms
is known as a schwerpunkt,226 which is a weak point, vulnerable to ex-
ploitation by a politicized military. Thus, for example, analyst Barry
Blechman pointed out that the military services "are notorious for seek-
ing to sidestep decisions by the [executive branch] by appealing to friends
[in Congress] ."227
The jointness 28 inspired by the Goldwater-Nichols Act also presents
an institutional problem for the executive branch. As the military services
adopt an increasingly unified perspective, the propensity to counterbal-
ance each other diminishes. Huntington maintained that as the officer
corps of the separate services become more unified, "this change will tend
to increase [the military's] authority with regard to other institutions of
government. It will speak with one voice instead of three. '229 Indeed, the
military already appreciates the value of a unified voice. Hedrick Smith
explained in The Power Game:
By operating as a cartel, [the military services] foil attempts at ruling
them, made by outsiders-including the secretary of Defense and his
sprawling staff of 1,765 civilians .... The service military chiefs have
a habit of withdrawing into the "tank"-their top-secret meeting area,
generally off-limits to civilian officials-to broker their differences
before civilian leaders intervene.20
With this backdrop, the Clinton presidency constitutes an especially
important challenge to the efficacy of the executive branch as a vehicle
for civilian control of the military. Perceived as improperly avoiding mili-
tary service during the Vietnam War, the President also is viewed by
many within and outside the military community as loathing the very
concept of military service.21 Like others in the Meritocratic Class, he is
considered untutored in military affairs. In addition, President Clinton's
Once civilian control is violated, even by the most halting attempt, a certain
purity is lost. The bond of trust between the military and society at large evapo-
rates. A new, corrupting element, something previously unthinkable partly be-
cause it has never been attempted, is injected into the political process. Once
this happens. . .[t]he possibility then forever lurks in the background ....
KOHN, supra note 17, at 38.
225. See generally C. Herman Pritchett, National Security and the United States
Judiciary, in THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 317, 320-25 (Howard E. Schuman
& Walter R. Thomas eds., 1990). The courts often use the political question doctrine to
"avoid dealing with a conflict between the president and Congress."
226. See EDWARD LUTTWAK & STUART L. KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 511
(1991).
227. BARRY M. BLECHMAN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 206 (1990).
228. See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1, JOINT WARFARE OF THE
US ARMED FORCES (1991) (arguing that, to prevail in modern warfare, separate services
must operate jointly).
229. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 87.
230. HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS 194 (1988); see also
W. J. Holland, Jointness Has Its Limits, PROCEEDINGS, May 1993, at 39, 40.
231. Admiral Crowe contended that the perceptions of Clinton are unfair. See CROWE
& CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 340-42.
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support for placing women in combat roles and his desire to end the ho-
mosexual exclusion policy could not have been more ill-timed as these
views assault the ethos of an organization already obsessively anxious
about its future in the post-Cold War world.232
The President's unpopularity within the military combined with an
almost universal distaste for his policies 233 translated into a license to ex-
press dissatisfaction and even contempt for the Commander-in-Chief.
The highly decorated, retired Army officer David Hackworth stated that
"[i]n almost a half-century of soldiering or writing about it, I've never
seen a president attacked so openly by the nation's fighting forces."2 3"
Following a much-publicized visit to an aircraft carrier where the officers
and crew made little effort to hide their contempt for President Clin-
ton,235 even military leaders became alarmed. Chief of Staff of the Air
Force General Merrill A. McPeak issued a letter reminding military per-
sonnel that the President stands at the top of the chain of command.2 38
Implicit was a thinly veiled warning to stop grousing. about the Com-
mander-in-Chief. Shortly after the issuance of the letter, Air Force Major
General Harold N. Campbell nonetheless allegedly denounced the Presi-
dent as a "gay loving,' ''pot smoking,' ''draft dodging, .... womanizer" in a
speech to military personnel.237
The Campbell incident illustrates the dwindling utility of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice23 as a tool for ensuring civilian control. If
accurate, the reports of the Campbell case, appear to squarely establish a
violation of Article 88 of the Code,239 a provision which criminalizes an
232. In November 1993, Air Force Magazine reported: "Morale and confidence of the
troops are growing concerns. The men and women of the armed forces are more apprehen-
sive than we have seen them in many years." Warning Signs on National Security, Aia
FORCE MAG., Nov. 1993, at 2.
233. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano & Art Pine, Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's
Policies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at 1.
234. See David Hackworth, Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. The President,
NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1993, at 24. Presidential historian Richard Norton Smith said that the
depth of feeling against President Clinton is unlike that of any relationship between the
military and its civilian leadership in modern history. Carl M. Cannon, Feeling Snubbed by
Administration, Military Views Clinton with Growing Distrust, BALT. SUN, Mar. 21, 1993,
at 22.
235. Bacevich, supra note 4.
236. John Lancaster, Air Force General Demands Tight Formation for Commander-
in-Chief, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1993, at 21.
237. Hackworth, supra note 234, at 24; see also Eric Schmitt, Clinton Facing More
Unease About Military, N.Y. Tmms, June 9, 1993, at 17; A Little Discipline from the Mili-
tary, L.A. TiMES, June 13, 1993, at M-4.
238. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1988).
239. See 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1988). The proscriptions of the Article are not limited to
statements against the President. The full text protects a number of civilian officials:
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President,
the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a mili-
tary department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature
of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or
present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
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officer's use of "contemptuous words against the President."24 0 Even
though prosecutions are rare,24 1 it would seldom seem more appropriate
to prosecute such conduct than when the President's integrity and au-
thority are openly questioned in the ranks. Despite this, General Camp-
bell was not tried by court-martial. Instead, he received nonjudicial
punishment,242 a disciplinary action which by law is limited to "minor
offenses. '243 Thus, open and notorious disrespect for the Commander-in-
Chief by a senior officer is now classified as a mere "minor offense." Re-
portedly, many in uniform still "privately salute" Campbell's remarks.2
The Campbell case follows other decisions which indicate that the
military justice system is seldom able to address high-profile cases with
political overtones involving senior officers.2 "4 The President's inability to
obtain respect, even through the military's disciplinary system, adversely
affects his ability to control the military. Columnist Mark August called
President Clinton a "man with a conscience," but observed:
Clinton suffers from being perceived as the political equivalent of a
Rodney Dangerfield because of the low regard in which he is held by
many people in the U.S. armed forces. Thus, without the ability to con-
trol the Pentagon during the nation's deliberation of critical issues, the
President has been obliged to accept painful compromises."'
The president's role as Commander-in-Chief is not, however, the only
means of control over the military that the Constitution provides the
chief executive. The president also appoints key civilian leaders for the
240. Id.
241. There is only one reported case. See United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429
(C.M.A. 1967). Second Lt. Howe was convicted of an Article 88 violation for carrying a sign
in a public demonstration that stated "LET'S HAVE MORE THAN A CHOICE BE-
TWEEN PETTY IGNORANT FACISTS (sic) IN 1968" and "END JOHNSON'S FACIST
(sic) AGGRESSION IN VIET NAM." Id. at 432.
242. See 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1988). Campbell reportedly was ordered to forfeit over
$7,000 in salary. Michael R. Gordon, General Ousted for Derisive Remarks about President,
N.Y. Tmss, June 19, 1993, at 19.
243. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1988).
244. Tom Miller & Matt Schofield, Defense Cuts, Clinton Erode Life in Military,
KANSAS Crry STAR, July 11, 1993, at B-1, B-2.
245. Admiral Crowe discussed the 1968 incident involving the U.S. Navy spy ship
Pueblo that was captured by North Korea. See CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 57-74.
Crowe reported that public opinion made the trial of the ship's captain implausible. Id. at
74. Another example is the failure to court-martial General John D. Lavelle, USAF, when
he-in direct violation of the orders of his civilian superiors-bombed North Vietnam. See
Kemp & Hudlin, supra note 10, at 9, 16-17. Authors Len Colodny and Robert Getlin argued
that potentially embarrassing disclosures convinced the Nixon Administration not to disci-
pline military personnel who were allegedly spying on the Administration. See COLODNY &
GnrrLIN, supra note 35, at 48-49. Furthermore, the Tailhook scandal has not produced any
successful prosecutions. See Richard A. Serrano, Prosecutors Strike Out With Tailhook
Scandal, L.A. TnMEs, Dec. 19, 1993, at 41. For a discussion of the Tailhook scandal, see
supra note 91.
246. Mark August, Don't Hand an Easy Victory to Gen. Aidid, TAMPA TRIB.-TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1993, at 5.
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armed services and the Department of Defense.2"7 Indeed, the Clinton
Administration's declared intent was to reassert the civilian control that
they believed waned during prior administrations. 24s The intent, however,
has evidently faded. In June 1993 the Washington Post described the
problem:
Civilian control of the military is a principle that the Clinton adminis-
tration [is] ... rightly defending. But there's a problem: To have some
control over the Pentagon, the civilians have to be on the job and be-
hind desks. And at the moment, a lot of desks are empty.24 9
As late as October 1993, the President still had announced his nominees
for "only 26 of the top 46 Defense Department jobs that require Senate
confirmation."2 50
Moreover, the Goldwater-Nichols Act251 ensures that appointees who
assume duties in the Department of Defense will confront a far more
powerful and sophisticated Joint Staff than ever before. Prior to the legis-
lation, the services seldom offered the best and brightest for duty with
the Joint Staff.252 Now, with joint service a prerequisite for promotion to
senior rank, the very "sharpest" officers serve there.25 3 Consequently, not
only are Meritocratic Class appointees less familiar with military affairs
than their predecessors, but also they must oversee a much more astute
and energized uniformed staff. Moreover, the Meritocrats work in an en-
vironment heavily dependent upon staff work and planning-tasks that
civilians historically perform less ably than military professionals. 25
Goldwater-Nichols affects executive branch appointees in other ways
as well. By streamlining the chain of command between the President
and the combatant commanders, Goldwater-Nichols theoretically im-
proved command and control of the armed forces. However, it did so,
according to Harry Summers, at the expense of the civilian service secre-
247. U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, cl. 2.
248. See generally Bruce B. Auster, Pentagon Culture Clash, NEWSWEEK, July 12,
1993, at 32; Barton Gellman, Pin Stripes Clash With Stars and Bars, WASH. POST, Nat'l
Wkly. Ed., Jun. 28-Jul. 4, 1993, at 31.
249. The Pentagon's Missing Civilians, WASH. POST, June 27, 1993, at C6.
250. Personnel Gap Yawns at the Pentagon, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1993, at 23.
251. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 10 U.S.C.).
252. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe noted
that prior to Goldwater-Nichols "[ult was unusual to find our most highly regarded officers
laboring in the Joint Staff vineyard; many considered a tour there as a hurdle on the career
path." CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 148; see also JANOWITZ, supra note 62, at 350-
54.
253. Lt. Gen. E. Ehlert, USMC, noted that the Marine Corps "used to send officers
who were retiring to work on the Joint Staff-not since Goldwater-Nichols. Now we send
our sharpest folks and so do the other services." Peter M. Chiarelli, Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols, JOINT FORCE Q., Autumn 1993, at 71, 77. See also 10 U.S.C. §619(e) (concerning
requirements of joint duty for promotion).
254. See generally Marshall Brement, Civilian-Military Relations in the Context of
National Security Policymaking, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Winter 1988, at 27, 28-30 (discussing
differences between military and civilian thinking).
1994]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
taries who, he observed, were "almost invisible during the Gulf War." 2"5
By diminishing the role of the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, Summers contended that Goldwater-Nichols removes an important
buffer between the uniformed services and the political decision makers
at the very time when "contentious issues [are] being pressed on the mili-
tary services."256
In addition, ever since the years when Secretary Robert McNamara
and the Vietnam-era "Whiz Kids" ruled the Pentagon, concerns existed
about the quality of military advice available to the President.257 Con-
gress addressed the problem in Goldwater-Nichols by substantially en-
hancing the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To ensure
that the professional military had a strong voice in national security af-
fairs, 25s Goldwater-Nichols established the Chairman as the military's
spokesman.
2 5 9
As the military's spokesman, General Colin Powell acquired unprece-
dented influence.2 0 Powell, a Vietnam veteran whose popularity far ex-
ceeded the President's, 61 opposed-with noteworthy finesse-some of
Clinton's key military policy proposals.2 2 Considered the consummate
soldier-politician, 263 Powell aggressively advanced his views to numerous
audiences, including public ones. 264 Powell presented his arguments too
255. Harry Summers, Weakened Checks and Balances, WASH. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at
G-3.
256. Id.
257. See Douglas Kinnard, McNamara at the Pentagon, in THE PARAMETERS OF WAR
165 (Lloyd J. Matthews & Dale E. Brown eds., 1989). Millett insisted that the "apogee of
civilian domination" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense occurred during the McNa-
mara years. MILLETr, supra note 2, at 42.
258. See generally Albert Pierce, Crises Management in the White House and the
Pentagon, in MANAGING MILITARY CRISES 51 (Preston Niblock ed., 1991).
259. See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. b9-433, § 201, 100 Stat. 992, 1004-08.
260. As the New York Times said of Powell, "much of his influence resulted from a
change in the law in 1986 [Goldwater-Nichols] to consolidate the powers of Chairman and
make him the single most important military advisor to the President." Eric Schmitt, Pow-
ell Retires, as Popular With the Public as With His Troops, N.Y. TIaMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at 1.
Goldwater-Nichols did not make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an actual mili-
tary commander out of concern about concentrating power into the hands of a single mili-
tary officer. See generally S. REP. No. 280, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2168, 2248 (discussing impact of Department of Defense Reorganization Act
on Joint Chiefs of Staff); ROBERT PRVIDI, CIVILIAN CONTROL VERSUS MILITARY RULE (1988).
261. According to the Air Force Times, a survey by the Wirthlin Group rated General
Powell as the country's most popular public official with a rating of 70.9% compared with
54.7% for Clinton. Fast Track, Am FORCE TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at 16.
262. A Chairman for Changing Times, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 14, 1993, at 18 (noting Gen-
eral Powell's opposition to President Clinton's proposals on homosexuals in the military in
editorial on nomination of General John Shalikashvili as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff).
263. CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 229 (Admiral Crowe calling General Powell
a "political general"). The Times of London described Crowe himself as "more of a political
animal than a warrior." Martin Fletcher, Grateful President Rewards Pentagon Politician's
Loyalty, THE TIMEs (London), Feb. 23, 1994, at 12.
264. See generally Steven Stark, President Powell?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at
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aggressively, according to military historian Russell F. Weigley 2 65 Profes-
sor Weigley argued that Powell's public opposition to intervention in Bos-
nia and his open resistance to the President's initial proposals concerning
homosexuals in the military overstepped the proper role of a military of-
ficer.2 68 Weigley argued that, partly due to Powell's outspokenness, civil-
ian control faces an uncertain future in the United States.8 7
The President's selection of General John Shalikashvili to replace
Powell may reflect a desire to avoid another popular, and almost autono-
mous, uniformed officer. Unlike Powell, General Shalikashvili is, accord-
ing to Time, "virtually unknown to the public and untutored in the ways
of Congress and public relations." '26 8 Time suggested that those qualities
"could prove doubly attractive [to Clinton] if it makes [Shalikashvili]
more compliant than his predecessor."26 9
Similarly, the designation- of Admiral Bobby Ray Inman to succeed
Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense appeared aimed at improving control
over the military.27 0 Not all were enthusiastic. Though a retired military
officer may legally serve as the senior civilian in the Department of De-
fense,27 1 critic Saul Landau called the nomination of the retired admiral a
"public surrender" of civilian control over the military.2 72 In any event,
Inman's charter surely included closing the gap between the military and
the President.
Following Inman's sudden withdrawal of his nomination, President
Clinton drafted former Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry for
the top spot. Considered a skilled and able technocrat, Perry may have
the tools necessary to control the Pentagon.273 Together these appoint-
ments may help the Clinton Administration improve relations with the
military. Indeed, U.S. News & World Report predicted that the President
"will almost certainly make peace with the military in 1994.' ' 214 It con-
cedes, however, that the peace "will probably have to be on the military's
terms.
21 5
The decline of the executive as a force for civilian control might be
22.
265. Weigley, supra note 4, at 27-32.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 58.
268. Bruce Van Voorst, Military Maneuvers, TIME, Aug. 23, 1993, at 35.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., Stephen C. LeSuer, Inman's Job: Close Military-Clinton Gap, DEF.
NEWS, Dec. 20-26, 1993.
271. An officer may not be appointed Secretary of Defense "within 10 years after relief
from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of the armed services."
10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1988).
272. Saul Landau, How the Military Brass Captured Clinton, BALT. SUN, Jan. 4, 1994,
at 11.
273. See John Lancaster, Can Perry Run the Defense, WASH. POST, Nat'l Wkly. Ed.,
Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1994, at 10.
274. Bruce Auster, Will Clinton and the Military Make Peace in 1994?, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Dec. 27, 1993-Jan. 3, 1994, at 52.
275. Id.
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dismissed as a transitory phenomenon idiosyncratic to the Clinton Ad-
ministration. Such a conclusion, however, is overly simplistic. The Ameri-
can people almost certainly will elect future presidents who lack a
military orientation. Future administrations will find it similarly difficult
to produce sufficient numbers of knowledgeable and experienced Mer-
itocratic Class civilians capable of matching the growing expertise and so-
phistication of the Joint Staff and other senior military leaders.
It appears that the struggle between the executive and the legislative
branches for primacy in military affairs will leave both, but particularly
the executive,27 6 vulnerable to manipulation by the military establish-
ment. With a military justice system seemingly incapable of holding ac-
countable senior officers who commit offenses that undermine civilian
control, future Commanders-in-Chief will find it difficult to control popu-
lar military leaders heading an equally popular military establishment.2 77
As the military becomes more involved and influential in domestic affairs,
controlling it may present the executive with a political problem of the
first order.
C. Congress
The Constitution assigns to Congress great responsibility for exercis-
ing civilian control of the military. 7 a Article I grants the legislature the
authority to declare war,27 9 make rules and regulations for the military,2 0
advise and consent to the appointment of officers, 81 call forth the mili-
tia,282 and, most important, raise and support an army283 and a navy.2 s
276. In the context of foreign policy, Eugene Rostow, citing the War Powers Resolu-
tion and other congressional initiatives, asserts that "the power of Congress is growing, and
that of the President is being leached away." EUGENE V. RoSTOW, PRESIDENT, PRIME MINIS-
TER, OR CONSTrrUTIONAL MONARCH? 45 (1989) (McNair Papers No. 3, Inst. for Nat'l Strategic
Stud.).
277. Conor Cruise O'Brien observed:
When he became president and tried to honor his promise [to end the homosex-
ual exclusion policy], he was taking on the military establishment of the United
States, which is immensely powerful, not only on land, sea, and air, but also in
the media. And I don't think it is a coincidence that the period of his confronta-
tion with the generals over gay rights was also one of the worst patches in terms
of media coverage that any president has had to endure.
Conor Cruise O'Brien, At Ease With His Generals Now, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 5, 1993, at
10.
278. Millett believed that in the division of powers in the Constitution, Congress was
intended to be the "more influential actor." MILLETr, supra note 2, at 7. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals also noted, "Because of national security interests and concern for unforeseen
military exigencies, it was the intent of the Framers to vest very great authority over these
matters in Congress." United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224, 236 (C.M.A. 1992) (quoting LAW-
RENCE TRIE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 353-56 (2d ed. 1988)), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 752
(1994).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
280. U.S, CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
281. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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Despite its powers, Congress' propensity to assert itself in military mat-
ters has waxed and waned over the years.
Since the Vietnam War, however, Congress has sought to become
much more active in the management and oversight of military affairs. 285
Aided by a quintupling of its staff since 1974, Congress annually makes
750,000 inquiries of the Pentagon and demands 750 yearly reports.28 Fur-
thermore, the Congress created potent support agencies like the General
Accounting Office (GAO), a huge 5,000 person investigatory organization
that frequently targets the military.2 17
The "power of the purse"2 8 unquestionably gives Congress its
strongest leverage over the military and its principal competitor for con-
trol of the military, the executive branch.2"' Congress readily demon-
strates its independence in this regard. For example, the Fiscal Year 1994
defense budget was less than the amount sought by both the Pentagon
and the Clinton Administration.29
When designing Congress' fiscal check on the growth of military
power and influence, the Founding Fathers never contemplated the effect
of the large peacetime military establishments that followed World War
11.291 Defense spending became a major sector of the economy with
"whole communities depending on defense bases, laboratories, and con-
tractors."2 92 In the ensuing scramble for billions of defense dollars, mem-
bers of Congress made defense decisions based on parochial, constituent
interests rather than national concerns.
In addition, the military undermines the fiscal check because it is a
particularly effective lobbyist. Like other agencies of government, the
armed forces are technically proscribed from lobbying, although they may
"communicate" with Congress. 293 Nevertheless, the military services em-
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
285. BLECHMAN, supra note 227, at 3-22; MILLETT, supra note 2, at 47.
286. See Book Review, NAT'L SEC. L. REP., Sept. 1993, at 3 (reviewing JOHN LEHMAN,
MAKING WAR THE 200-YEAR-OLD BATTLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OVER How
AMERICA GOES TO WAR (1992)).
287. Congress also has the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget
Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment to facilitate the oversight process. See MI.-
LETT, supra note 2, at 48.
288. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7. See generally Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the
Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (discussing Congress' appropriations powers and its limita-
tions and effect on the executive).
289. "Congress' control of the purse is a far greater power than the President's as
commander in chief." See Graebner, supra note 214, at 118.
290. See Eric Schmitt, $261 Billion Set for the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at
25.
291. See SWOMLEY, supra note 55, at 99-112 (describing Pentagon's economic power
and its threat to American democracy).
292. THOMAAs L. McNAUGHER, NEW WEAPONS, OLD POLITICS 10 (1989).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988). The statute provides in part:
No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress, shall, in the
absence of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to
pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed
or written matter, or other device, intended or designed to influence in any man-
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ploy a number of imaginative techniques to influence legislation. Accord-
ing to Hedrick Smith, they "unabashedly lobby senators and House
members '29 4 by flattering them "with courtesies and perquisites 20 0 such
as domestic and foreign trips.296 More disturbing, the military often will
ensure support by spreading the procurement of expensive weapons sys-
tems over scores of congressional districts.297 Smith also insisted that the
"military can turn off the faucet" when displeased with a legislator.29 8
Even the most vociferous military critic is subject to pressure when the
economic livelihood of constituents is at stake. Armed Forces Journal al-
leged that Congressman Ron Dellums "was probably right" when the mil-
itary critic charged that the closing of four military bases in his district
was politically motivated. 2 9 The magazine blamed the Pentagon, claim-
ing its "temptation to deal poetic justice was likely more than it could
resist."30 0
Nevertheless, with the decline of executive control of the military,
Congress has emerged as the most effective agent of civilian control. How-
ever, Congress-like the executive-is beginning to feel the effects of the
rise of the Meritocratic Class. The election of 1982 pushed the percentage
of military veterans in Congress below fifty percent for the first time since
before Pearl Harbor.301 Additionally, after the 1994 election, half of Con-
gress may have less than six years of seniority.3 0 2 Such a development,
compounded by the youth and inexperience of the vast majority of its
20,000 staffers, 03 indicates that Congress' expertise in military affairs will
suffer.
Evidence of the Meritocratic Class emerges elsewhere. Former Secre-
tary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, for example, faulted GAO report-
ing-upon which Congress depends-because the GAO is staffed by
ner a Member of Congress, to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legisla-
tion or appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the introduction of
any bill or resolution proposing such legislation or appropriation; but this shall
not prevent officers or employees of the United States or of its departments or
agencies from communicating to Members of Congress on the request of any
Member or to Congress, through the proper official channels, requests for legisla-
tion or appropriations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of the
public business ....
Id.
294. SMITH, supra note 230, at 185.
295. Id.
296. Id.; see, e.g., Jim Drinkard, Military Aircraft Booked Solid with Hill "Fact-Find-
ers," WASH. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at 1.
297. For example, contracts related to the controversial B-1 bomber were spread over
48 states. See SMITH, supra note 230, at 179-82.
298. Id. at 185.
299. See David Silverberg, Congress: Friend or Foe?, ARMED FORCES J., Jan. 1994, at
10, 10-11.
300. Id.
301. Moskos, supra note 90, at 86.
302. See Richard S. Dunham, Washington is Becoming a City of Amateurs, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 11, 1993, at 47.
303. GANSLER, supra note 69, at 110.
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people who "neither understand nor like the military."30 4 Consequently,
Congress is hampered directly and indirectly in its efforts to control the
military.
Congress also is the institution that suffers most from a loss of public
confidence vis-a-vis the military. It finished dead last in the 1993 Harris
poll that showed the military as the institution with the public's highest
confidence.30 5 Furthermore, in a stark indication of the public's disgust
with elected government, an August 1993 poll revealed that fifty percent
of Americans believe Congress is corrupt. 06 The numbers suggest that a
poll-sensitive Congress must exercise caution when asserting its authority
over the highly respected military. Otherwise it risks imperiling its al-
ready depressed standing in the public's perception.
In a larger sense, the breakdown of party discipline and the increas-
ing fragmentation of Congress leaves the institution vulnerable. Robert J.
Bresler argued that power in Washington has "never been more dif-
fuse."307 Congress, he noted, "lacks a clear sense of where it wants to
go." 30 8 As long as its members pursue divisive "personal agendas, legisla-
tive relationships, and national constituency politics,"3 0 9 Congress will
struggle to achieve the authoritative consensus most conducive to over-
seeing a popular, united, and sophisticated military.
D. The Press
The Constitution provides an important indirect check on military
power: a free press.3 10 The potency of the check has been keenly under-
stood by the military. For example, Napoleon declared that "four hostile
newspapers were more to be feared than a thousand bayonets." 31' Simi-
larly, Shakespeare correctly observed that "men wearing rapiers are
afraid of goose-quills. '312 While not a formal mechanism of civilian con-
trol of the military, the press has tremendous potential to limit military
ambitions.
It is virtually an article of faith within the United States armed
forces that the press is instinctively hostile to the military.3 1 3 Much of
this is yet another vestige of the Vietnam conflict, in which the media is
viewed as having played "a principal role in eroding public support" for
the war.31" Like other lessons of Vietnam, the armed forces learned from
304. Caspar W. Weinberger, Commentary, FORBES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 35.
305. See Correll, supra note 93, at 26.
306. Outlook, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 16, 1993, at 10; see also Kevin Merida,
It'll Take an Act of Congress to Clean Up Its Image, WASH. POST, Nat'l Wkly. Ed., Feb. 7-
13, 1994, at 13.
307. Robert J. Bresler, Politics of Dissatisfaction, USA TODAY MAG., Nov. 1993, at 15.
308. Id.
309. BLECHMAN, supra note 227, at 202.
310. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
311. THE SWORD AND THE PEN 9 (Adrian L. Hart ed., 1976).
312. Id.
313. MmL r, supra note 2, at 55.
314. E. L. Pattulo, War and the American Press, PARAMETERS, Winter 1992-93, at 61,
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its mistakes.
When the Gulf War broke out, the military was prepared. The press,
on the other hand, was not. The staff of U.S. News & World Report in
Triumph Without Victory issued a harsh assessment of their colleagues:
Journalists poorly prepared to cover war, high technology, and interna-
tional diplomacy were assigned to cover the conflict in the Gulf. A great
many embarrassed the profession. By contrast, briefers provided to the
press by the military seemed, more often than not, professional, knowl-
edgeable, and worthy of trust. The situation became so bad that "Sat-
urday Night Live" aired a skit satirizing the performance of the press
corps assigned to cover Desert Storm and lauding the military.3 15
During the Gulf War, the military learned to exploit the tremendous
power of images to shape public opinion. Advanced munitions guidance
systems and intelligence technology enabled it to obtain a mass of photo-
graphs and videos. Because they controlled these sources, military au-
thorities could select powerful images that favorably reinforced the story
that the military wished to tell. 16 In doing so, the military capitalized on
the increasing propensity of Americans to rely on television for news.311
To the extent it controls the images, the military can exploit the "vide-
ocentric prejudice," that is, the uncritical belief that what is seen in visual
representations is, in fact, true.3 18
The Gulf War exposed other difficulties in the press' attempt to
cover the military. Today's military can move vast distances at enormous
speeds in places where civilian transportation is limited or nonexistent.
Weaponry with a range and destructive power that often exceeds its abil-
ity to distinguish between enemy troops and noncombatant reporters
make press excursions independent of military escorts not only difficult
and expensive, 329 but exceptionally dangerous. To further complicate
matters, media representatives covering the military in austere locations
often depend upon military communication channels to dispatch their
stories. Consequently, the media is sometimes obliged to court the mili-
tary to ensure access and support.
Today's military also employs advanced training techniques to man-
age the media. In addition to rigorous training primarily directed at sen-
63.
315. U.S. Nzws & WORLD REP., TRIUMPH WITHOUT VIcTORY: THE HISTORY OF THE PER-
SIAN GULF WAR 413 (1992).
316. See John Pilger, A One-Sided Bloodfest, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'Y, Mar. 8, 1993,
at 9.
317. See generally Dennis M. Drew, How Television Shapes Foreign Policy, AIR
FORCE T is, Nov. 29, 1993, at 39.
318. What makes the videocentric prejudice so vulnerable to manipulation is that the
ordinary viewer does not take into account the images' context, the impact of camera rheto-
ric, or the effect of selective presentation. See Is Viewing a Threat to Democracy?, USA
TODAY MAG., Apr. 1993, at 15.
319. Dennis M. Drew argued that the press engages in "journalism on the cheap," that
is, it avoids the stories that are "far from popular watering holes and often difficult to
reach." Drew, supra note 317, at 39.
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ior officers, 20 the services now educate even low ranking soldiers to
handle the press. Thus, in February 1993 the National Training Center
(NTC) began a program integrating media training with regular battle-
field exercises.3 21 Canny military instructors argued that "[1]earning to re-
spond to reporters is just as important as learning to kill the enemy. '322
While much of the training instructed soldiers to avoid violating opera-
tional or mission security, there is little doubt that it is also meant to
shape the military's public image. As the noncommissioned officer in
charge of the NTC's "Media on the Battlefield" exercise insisted,
"[soldiers] have got to be able to tell a positive Army story. 323
It is a gross error, however, to underestimate the press' ability to af-
fect military activities. Many observers believe the media decision to air
film of starving children led to the deployment of American troops in
Somalia.32 4 Most also agree that the images of a captured American air-
man and of the abuse inflicted on the body of a dead soldier led to the
withdrawal.3
25
Whatever the news business is today, it remains a business. News
executives, especially after the media fiasco of the Gulf War, must appre-
ciate the huge disparity between the public's confidence in the armed
forces and their own profession.3 26 Thus, while a willingness still exists to
harshly critique the civilian portion of the military establishment, the
media has scrutinized the uniformed ranks more gingerly.3 27 To many, the
change is baffling. Columnist Fred Reed speculated that the less hostile
reporting might be a result of a "new crowd" of less jaundiced post-Viet-
nam-era journalists favorably impressed by the military's Gulf War
performance.32 1
Much of the press suffers the same lack of a thorough comprehension
320. See CROWE & CHANOFF, supra note 53, at 224 (discussing the Air Force Media
Training Team).
321. Chris Murray, Troops Learn How to Deal with Shelling from Reporters, AIR
FORCE Tihms, June 7, 1993, at 28.
322. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Master Sergeant James Edwards of the operations
center of the National Military Training Center, Fort Irwin, California).
323. Id. (quoting Sergeant 1st Class Mary Pollard).
324. E.g., Drew, supra note 317.
325. See, e.g., Richard Harwood, Ruling Class Journalists, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1993,
at A21.
326. In a Gallup poll released in April 1993, 68% of those polled said they had a
"great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military; television news received that
rating from 48% of the public, while newspapers garnered a mere 31% grade. See Moore, &
Newport, supra note 113, at 24.
327. For example, when 18 American troops died and 78 were wounded during an Oc-
tober 3, 1993, raid in Mogadishu, Somalia, media attention focused on an earlier decision by
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to deny a military request for armored vehicles. Although it
was later determined that the refusal of the armor did not cause the casualties, the focus
remained on the Secretary. Calls for the Secretary's resignation ultimately succeeded. See,
e.g., Bill Gertz, Senate Committee Investigates Pentagon's Policy in Somalia, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1993, at 1.
328. Fred Reed, Reformers Are Gone-Good Riddance, AIR FORCE TIMES, Sept. 20,
1993, at 59.
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of military affairs as the other civilian institutions that control the mili-
tary, and for much the same reason: It is staffed by the Meritocratic
Class. The press' expertise 2" is declining at the very time the military's
ability to deal with the media has become more effective. The develop-
ment can adversely affect civilian control of the military. Addressing the
potential dangers of the military-industrial complex, President Eisen-
hower counselled that "it is only a citizenry, an alert and informed citi-
zenry which can keep these abuses from coming about."330 While the
press remains, a powerful-arguably the most powerful-check on the
military, the media's status as a forceful safeguard of civilian control is
not assured.
E. The Militia
By providing for a militia in the Constitution, the Framers sought to
strengthen civilian control of the military.3 They postulated that a mili-
tia composed of citizen-soldiers would curb any unseemly ambitions of
the small standing army.332 Today's National Guard is often perceived as
the successor to the militia, and observers still tout the Guard's role as
the ultimate restraint on the professional military.333
The reality, however, is much different. Today's National Guard is a
very different force from the colonial-era militia.334 With 178,000 full-time
federal employees and almost all of its budget drawn from the federal
government,3 5 the National Guard is, for all practical purposes, a federal
force.336 Indeed, one commentator concluded that it is very much akin to
329. See, e.g., Fred Reed, How Smart Are Reporters?, AIR FORCE TINEs, Dec. 6, 1993,
at 78.
330. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: SOLDIER AND PRESIDENT 538 (1990). Thomas
Jefferson believed a free press to be more important than government itself. He remarked
that if obliged to choose between a government without newspapers and newspapers without
governments, he would "not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter." THE MACMILLAN
DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 404 (Lewis D. Eigen & Jonathan P. Siegal eds., 1993).
Likewise, General George C. Marshall contended that:
In our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the popular will,
military policy is dependent on public opinion, and our organization for war will
be as good or as bad as the public is well informed or poorly informed regarding
the factors that bear on the subject.
Kohn, Introduction, supra note 27, at 1.
331. See generally Fields & Hardy, supra note 18.
332. See KOHN, supra note 17, at 84-85.
333. See Commentary & Reply, PARAMETERS, Autumn 1993, at 105, 107-08 (letters of
Lt. Gen John B. Conaway, U.S. Air Force, Chief, National Guard Bureau; Col. Reid K.
Beveridge, Delaware Army National Guard).
334. See generally Allan R. Millett, The Constitution and the Citizen Soldier, in THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 1789-1989, at 97 (Richard H. Kohn ed.,
1991).
335. The federal government provided $4.7 billion for National Guard and reserve pay
in fiscal year 1992. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE ALMANAC, supra note 128, at 23.
336. David R. Segal explained the reason for the evolution into a much more federally
oriented force: "Americans acknowledged the problems of mobilizing for major wars a mili-
tia that was organized by the governments of the states, and Americans increasingly central-
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the "standing army" against which the Founding Fathers railed.337 De-
spite the National Guard's record of achievement in combat support
roles, the fighting ability of part-time soldiers clearly does not match that
of active duty forces. 338 As a result, the citizen-soldiers do not meaning-
fully check the power of full-time professionals.
Perhaps due to its inability to compete with active forces in the com-
bat sphere,339 the National Guard enthusiastically pursues noncombat do-
mestic missions.310 The Guard has dual state and federal3 41 status and
very often conducts missions in their "state" status. 342 Theoretically, the
citizen-soldiers are under local control. This concept is more chimerical
than factual since virtually all of the indoctrination, training plans, and
resources come from the federal government. In addition, as domestic
missions proliferate they acclimate society to a military presence in a va-
riety of local matters. Few members of the public appreciate the technical
"status" distinction of a National Guard whose outward appearance and
equipment is indistinguishable from that of the active duty military. Con-
sequently, the National Guard may unwittingly further the influence of
the active duty military in domestic affairs.
Despite similarities with the full-time military, the National Guard
has no apolitical tradition. With units in every state, it unabashedly as-
serts political power. 343 In the near future, this politicized force will be-
come more integrated with the active duty military. Specifically, following
the much-discussed "bottom up" review of U.S. military strategy for the
remainder of the 1990's, the Pentagon has called for greater Guard in-
ized the control of the military mobilization system in the federal government." See SEGAL,
supra note 53, at 151.
337. Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 2.
338. Study after study shows that part-time soldiers simply do not train sufficiently to
function effectively in ground combat maneuver units. See Richard L. Stouder, Roundout
Brigades: Ready or Not?, MIL. REv., June 1993, at 38, 38-49 (citing studies by the General
Accounting Office, the Department of the Army Inspector General, and the Congressional
Research Service).
339. See Philip Drew, Taking the Guard Out of Combat, NAT'L GUARD, Apr. 1991, at
38.
340. According to National Guard Bureau Chief Lt. Gen. John B. Conaway, "We are
getting heavier and heavier each day in America and around the world into what we call
nontraditional roles." New Civilian Tasks for the Military, supra note 132.
341. See generally 32 U.S.C. (1988).
342. For example, Guard members typically performed law enforcement activities in
their status as state employees, as distinguished from their federalized status, when they
were incorporated into the active United States military. See National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 100-456, § 1105, 102 Stat. 1918, 2047 (1988).
343. The Washington Post reported: "With an armory in virtually every congressional
district and an officer corps made up of stockbrokers, lawyers, and the like, the [Guard and
reserve] forces command a political clout and a share of the defense budget that far out-
strips their military mission." Barton Gellman, Pentagon Plan Would Cut Reserve, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 11, 1993, at Al. Likewise, the Los Angeles Times noted that the National Guard
exercises "stunning political power and influence, both among state and local government
and in the power centers of Washington." Art Pine, In Defense of 2nd Line Defenders, L.A.
TINMES, Mar. 13, 1992, at 1; see also Rick Maze, Political Clout Shields Guard, Reserve from
Cuts, ARMY TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at 19.
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volvement in plans to fight two simultaneous regional wars.3 44 As the
Guard becomes more integrated with the military services, the Guard's
aggressive political culture may generate unforeseen difficulties.
Notwithstanding efforts to improve the combat skills of the Guard, it
is unlikely that it will ever develop into a force capable of control of the
active duty military as the Founding Fathers hoped the militia would.
Ideally, greater integration of the Guard with the active forces will
"civilianize" the professional military and enhance civilian control. The
more likely scenario, however, is that the Guard will pave the way for
greater military involvement in domestic activities. Such a development,
if accompanied by a merger of the growing politicization of the active
forces and the Guard's existing political clout, could result in a unified
force with enormous potential to frustrate civilian control.
VII. AN AMERICAN MILITARY COUP?
Even the slightest suggestion of a military coup is almost unheard of
in the American political tradition. Today's military officers are no more
consciously disposed toward the improper aggrandizement of power than
those of any other age.3 45 Yet it is precisely this fact that makes the mili-
tary's current drift into civilian affairs so insidious. Without malice afore-
thought, a political structure that may be subject to nefarious
exploitation in the future is being validated.
In the context of Finer's models, 346 military intervention into politics
in the United States does not yet exceed a level of dynamic influence.
Likewise, not all influence is improper. As Finer recognized, military or-
ganizations, like other agencies of government have the right, if not the
obligation, to persuade the government to adopt their views of matters
properly within their area of responsibility.3 47 Threats to civilian control
arise when that "area of responsibility" expands to include problems that
should be left to the civilian leadership to resolve, such as economic and
social problems. Furthermore, military influence improperly erodes the
principle of civilian control when it results not from the innate worth of
the military's views, but from the growing power of a popular, respected
military deeply inculcated into a political environment characterized by
weakened democratic institutions. This scenario has not yet occurred in
the United States. A commentator warned, however, that while the
United States military has not shown the "slightest inclination to lust for
political power," the potential to do so "always lurks where power and
respect converge. '348
344. Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Sees A Greater Role for Reservists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1993, at Al.
345. According to journalist Thomas E. Ricks, "military officers don't dwell on the
civilian-military relationship-they take it for granted." See Thomas E. Ricks, Colonel
Dunlap's Coup, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1993, at 23, 25.
346. For a discussion of Finer's model, see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
347. FINER, supra note 24, at 128.
348. Martin Anderson, The Benefits of the Warrior Class, BALT. SUN, Apr. 14, 1991, at
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Moreover, the danger of a challenge to civilian control is exacerbated
when the military perceives itself to be under stress, as it does today.349
A.J. Bacevich, the executive director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, recently de-
scribed the implications of today's military environment in National
Review:
The post-Cold War military environment-institutional uncertainty
(how deep will the cuts go?), burgeoning technological change (what is
the face of modern warfare?), renewed interest in social experimenta-
tion (what is the role for women and gays?), combined with expanding
expectations of what the military can and ought to do to make peace,
succor the afflicted, and respond to disasters--fosters conditions where
civil-military harmony should not be taken for granted. To foresee the
potential for friction is a far cry from declaring it inevitable. To predict
that it could lead to anything like a military coup would strike most
Americans as far fetched. Yet ignoring the military distemper will only
allow it to fester. 50
As the United States approaches the twenty-first century, a modern trend
not only allows the military's distemper to fester, but also changes the
nation's relationship with its military. Specifically, the country's tradi-
tional antimilitarism is being replaced by what might be called
postmodern militarism.
Unlike conventional militarism, 351 postmodern militarism is not
marked by overt military dominance or even a societal embrace of martial
values. To the contrary, in the United States it arises in a citizenry which
largely embraces permissive individualism-hardly a military trait.
Postmodern militarism admires the effectiveness of the military but re-
jects for civilian society the discipline and sacrifice necessary to achieve
it. Postmodern militarism also is characterized by the proclivity to define
a nation's place in the world in terms of military strength. 5' Paradoxi-
cally, another of its cardinal features is the populace's corporate unfamili-
arity with the true nature of the military. The nation's people celebrate
military power without truly understanding the institution that produces
it. Likewise, postmodern militarism looks to the armed forces for answers
to perplexing societal problems without apprehending the long-term im-
plications of military-derived solutions.
The Meritocratic leadership elites display a postmodern militarism
that considers the armed forces much like a bright, loyal, and hardwork-
ing servant who conveniently undertakes difficult and unattractive tasks,
but who most assuredly lacks the enterprising aptitude for invidious am-
3F.
349. See generally Tom Philpott, The Mood of the Military, AI FORCE TIMES, Jun.
14, 1993, at 14.
350. Bacevich, supra note 4.
351. For a discussion of traditional militarism, see Charles Townsend, Militarism and
Modern Society, WILSON Q., Winter 1993, at 71.
352. Id.
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bition. The Meritocratic elites prize the capabilities and sense of power
that the military appears to afford them, but their appreciation does not
extend to genuine respect on terms of equality. As with any valued em-
ployee, the Meritocrats desire cordial relations with the armed forces, but
avoid personal association with a military that they view as intellectually
plebeian and, therefore, unlike themselves.
Both the Meritocratic elites and the American people fail to compre-
hend today's military from which they are increasingly estranged. More
than ever before, the military is, as the Supreme Court commented, "a
specialized society separate from civilian society. '353 The separation is at-
tributable to the military's unique responsibility for national defense in
general, and warfighting specifically. To accomplish its mission, the mili-
tary must foster, as the Court observed in Goldman v. Weinberger,3 14 "in-
stinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." 355 Military
personnel perceive most of American society as conspicuously lacking
those qualities. Not surprisingly, therefore, they often prefer to live in
their own military enclaves, complete with homes, schools, churches,
stores, and entertainment facilities.356 From their virtually crime-free, or-
derly communities, they "tend to view the chaotic civilian world with sus-
picion and sometimes hostility. '357
The separation of the military from civilian society provides an
added challenge for civilian control of the military. Military professiondls
ordinarily seek to establish order out of chaos.358 Survival may depend
upon a unit's ability to maintain order in the confusion of the battlefield.
To meet the demands of combat, the military governs itself in an unapo-
logetically authoritarian way; it rarely seeks the consensus or tolerates the
dissent that civilian society takes for granted. The military is by no
means a democracy; indeed, the military is the antithesis of democracy.350
What postmodern militarism fails to grasp is that military personnel are
untroubled by the authoritarian system in which they live; indeed, they
cherish the harmony it provides. Members of the armed services do not
necessarily admire or desire the unbridled individualism enjoyed by civil-
353. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). Military analyst Arthur T. Hadley la-
beled the separation the "Great Divorce." ARTHUR T. HADLEY, THE STRAW GIANT 22 (1986).
He also defined it as "the less-than-amicable separation of the military from the financial,
business, political, and intellectual elites of this country, particularly from the last two." Id.
354. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
355. Id. at 507.
356. The Air Force Times reported: "Most families ... like to live close to military
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tary community when they do." Rick Maze, Opposition: Off-Base Bad for Families, AIR
FORCE TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 4.
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ian society. As a result, their commitment to the democratic political sys-
tem is extant but abstract.
Some in the military view the democratic process as imposing gratui-
tous inefficiency on the problem-solving mechanism. Others consider it
hopelessly subverted by parochial concerns that imperil paramount na-
tional interests. Virtually all despise the compromises and duplicity in-
herent in modern politics. As often as not, they regard the political
process as yet another obstacle to mission accomplishment. "[D]emocracy
is not," as General Powell observed, "an easy form of government for mil-
itary professionals. 360
It is particularly relevant then that postmodern militarism arises in
the context of growing military expertise-and interest-in political af-
fairs. As the military becomes more aware of its political power, it demon-
strates a greater willingness to use it to advance military interests. The
military's natural inclination is to displace the deficiencies of the existing
political processes with the self-contained authoritarian methodologies it
knows, understands, and considers effective. As the military's responsibil-
ities become increasingly open-ended, the potential exists for the military
to assume it has the right, and even the obligation, to intervene in a wide
range of activities when it perceives it can advance a broadly defined no-
tion of the national interest.361 Once the military arrogates to itself such
discretion, civilian control is truly in jeopardy.
Finally, postmodern militarism seems to assume that a military inte-
grated into domestic roles will be "civilianized" by the process and
thereby rendered more amenable to civilian control. There are few mod-
els, however, for the "civilianization" of professional militaries. For exam-
ple, the military's deep involvement in civil affairs during the occupation
of Germany following World War II did not "Germanize" the United
States military. British regulars serving in colonial posts during the nine-
teenth century did not assume the cultures of the countries to which they
were assigned; to the contrary, they often significantly influenced the in-
digenous societies in the nations where they served. Hence, postmodern
militarism's optimistic assumption that the military will be "civilianized"
may be dangerously erroneous.
The profession of arms is an exclusive culture, and one that is much
more separated from civilian society than postmodern militarism sup-
poses. Soldiers "are trained to do socially obnoxious things, like shooting
people and blowing up bridges. As a result they have a different view of
life."'36 2 Military historian John Keegan explained:
Soldiers are not as other men-that is the lesson that I have learned
from a life cast among warriors. The lesson has taught me to view with
extreme suspicion all theories and representations of war that equate it
360. SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE, DEALING WITH DEMOCRACY 4 (1991) (policy letter).
361. This is one of the bases for military intervention identified by Finer. See Finer,
supra note 24, at 30-33.
362. Paul Quinn-Judge, Military Debate: Reflection of US or Breed Apart?, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 12, 1993, at 21 (quoting colonel who wished to remain anonymous).
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with any other activity in human affairs .... War is wholly unlike
diplomacy or politics because it must be fought by men whose values
and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are those of a
world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the eve-
ryday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time,
and the warrior world adapts in step to the civilian. It follows it, how-
ever, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of
the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.3 63
In a very basic sense, postmodern militarism misapprehends the war-
rior ethic and the effect it has on military society. The frailties of the'
human condition necessitate armed forces, and the United States has
shown the genius to create an enormously powerful military. Yet, just as
the military can keep a nation free, it can, without effective civilian con-
trol, enslave a nation as well.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the end of the Cold War, a catalogue of remaining threats, as
well as the myriad of obligations as the world's sole superpower, compels
the United States to maintain large military forces. Consequently, it is
imperative that immediate steps be taken to revitalize civilian control of
militaTy forces. The following actions are recommended:
- We must develop a new model for civilian control of the military. Hunt-
ington preferred the notion of "objective" civilian control.3 6' Objective ci-
vilian control militarizes or "professionalizes" the military by consigning
the armed forces exclusively to the apolitical task of the management of
violence.36 5 Huntington contended that objective civilian control will
render the armed forces "politically sterile and neutral," albeit as milita-
rily powerful as security needs dictate.3 6
It is probably not possible-or even desirable-to render the military
truly "politically sterile." Political issues and sensitivities are too inter-
twined with national security policy for the military to ignore. However,
we can ensure that the military's focus remains on external threats. Pre-
paring to fight two regional wars simultaneously is more than a sufficient
occupation for a shrinking military. Minimizing the military's involve-
ment in domestic affairs would reduce the potential for dangerous conflict
with civilian authorities.
- We must combat the growing lack of military experience and expertise
in the senior civilian leadership. To accomplish this objective, the nation's
war colleges should increase representation from the civilian ranks of gov-
ernment. In addition, at least part of the curriculum should be opened to
key members of the media, as well as leaders from social institutions and
business. To broaden the outlook of future officers, and to acquaint more
363. JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE at xvi (1993).
364. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 83-85.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 84.
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of the Meritocrats with members of the armed services, military academy
cadets should spend a year at a top civilian institution.3 6 7 For the same
reasons, mid-level officers should spend at least one year obtaining an ad-
vanced degree in a residence program at a leading university. Civilian
universities should include more national security and military history
courses in their curricula. Likewise, professional military education
should place greater emphasis on the historical basis for, and contempo-
rary challenges to, the concept of civilian control of the military.
- Key Pentagon posts must be filled in a timely manner. Finding qualified
women and minorities for the posts is an obviously laudable goal, but it
must not deprive the military of civilian leadership during crucial
periods. 88
- The judiciary must retain its deference to the elected branches of gov-
ernment. When appropriate, the adverse effect of judicial intervention on
civilian control of the military should be highlighted for the courts.
* Congress and the executive branch must take a more collaborative and
cooperative approach to controlling the military. National concerns must
take precedence over parochial interests when dealing with military is-
sues. Congress and the executive branch also must resolve the dilemma of
the War Powers Resolution before it manifests itself in a ominous conun-
drum for a military commander.
* The media must lessen its dependence on the military for information,
transportation, and communications support when reporting on armed
conflict. Care must be taken to ensure that operational security is not
compromised, but the media must be prepared to function independent
from a military logistics base.
* Most important, Americans must not allow a desire for economic and
personal security to cause them to abandon their faith in traditional de-
mocracy. Americans seem to expect that democracy will automatically
lead to growth despite evidence that indicates it is not necessarily related
to economic development.369 Americans should remember that even in a
relatively depressed economy they still enjoy one of the highest standards
of living in the world. Though they castigate elected government for their
personal financial troubles, it is nevertheless true that business down-
turns are an inevitable part of the economic cycle.3s 0
* Clearly, however, it is in the area of physical security that, according to
Charles Townsend, "liberal states remain vulnerable to the blurring of
civil and military functions."3"7 The spiraling crime rate in America has
generated calls for dramatic measures including patrols by soldiers.372
367. Janowitz suggested such an approach. JANOWrrz, supra note 62, at lii.
368. The Pentagon's Missing Civilians, supra note 249, at C6. According to the Wash-
ington Post, one reason offered by Clinton Administration supporters for the delay in filling
Pentagon jobs was the desire to "bring women and minorities into top posts." Id.
369. See generally Karen Pennar et. al., Is Democracy Bad for Growth?, Bus. WK.,
June 7, 1993, at 84.
370. Samuelson, supra note 100.
371. See Townsend, supra note 351, at 83.
372. For a discussion of calls for soldiers in American cities, see" supra note 131 and
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Americans fail to realize that crime is a tragic byproduct of the prosperity
and expansion of personal rights enjoyed since the end of World War II.
Professor James Q. Wilson of UCLA believed that the crime rate will rise
"regardless of what government does." He explained:
The most significant thing in the last half-century has been the dra-
matic expansion in personal freedom and personal mobility, individual
rights, the reorienting of culture around individuals. We obviously
value that. But like all human gains, it has been purchased at'a price.
Most people faced with greater freedom from family, law, village, clan,
have used it for good purposes-artistic expression, economic entrepre-
neurship, self-expression-but a small fraction of people have used it
for bad purposes. So just as we have had an artistic and economic ex-
plosion, we have had a crime explosion. I think the two are indissolubly
entwined.37 3
Consequently, we must reject the inclination to resort indiscriminately to
the military to stop crime.
CONCLUSION
Postmodern militarism entices Americans to task the military with
the quixotic mission of providing perfect security. By doing so they un-
wittingly invite a stifling of the expansive freedom and spontaneous indi-
vidualism that produces the very society they seek. In the final analysis,
it is the American people who must make some hard decisions about the
kind of nation in which they wish to live. If they continue to turn to the
military for answers, if they abandon their attachment to the democratic
process, if they fall to take the necessary action to reinvigorate civilian
control, if they persist in exalting inflated notions of security over all
other human values, then they will get, as it is often said, the government
they deserve. If that becomes the case, then we must sadly say, "Welcome
to the junta!"
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